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ABSTRACT 
States place a heavy reliance on sales tax revenues to finance government activities. The 
rise in e-commerce, coupled with constitutional restrictions on imposing sales tax nexus, 
has resulted in a decline in sales tax revenues in many states. States have responded by 
enacting legislation and reinterpreting existing statutes to curb these declining revenues. 
This study provides evidence that sales tax revenues are larger after states enforce some, 
but not all, sales tax measures aimed at imposing nexus on Internet retailers. Further 
evidence suggests a shift in consumer preferences to local consumption in states 
enforcing broadened nexus, as evidenced by greater state-level retail gross domestic 
product (GDP) after states enforce broadened sales tax nexus. Additionally, the number 
of physical establishments of Internet retailers is lower after states expand sales tax 
nexus, suggesting these retailers remove their physical presence in states to avoid 
collecting sales taxes. Finally, the increase in retail GDP has a spillover effect on 
corporate income taxes, with states enforcing broader sales tax nexus on Internet sales 
realizing larger corporate income tax revenues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Sales tax receipts are an important source of revenue at the state level. Currently, 
45 states and the District of Columbia impose a general sales tax, and although reliance 
on sales taxes varies across states, on average general sales taxes account for roughly 
one-third of total state tax revenues.1 Overall sales tax revenues have been declining over 
the past two decades (Bruce and Fox, 2000; Bruce, Fox, and Luna, 2009), in large part 
due to nexus constraints on imposing a sales tax collection responsibility on online 
retailers (e-tailers).2,3 This study examines the impact of state enforcement initiatives 
broadening sales tax nexus to require e-tailers to collect sales taxes. 4 Specifically, I begin 
with the impact on state sales tax collections and then further explore spillover effects to 
state gross domestic product from retail, the number of retail establishments, and 
corporate income tax collections in states enforcing a broader scope of sales tax nexus. 
It is widely accepted that e-tailers have a competitive advantage relative to 
traditional brick-and-mortar stores due to the inability of states to impose nexus on e-
tailers (Hoopes, Thornock, and Williams, 2016). E-tailers, aware of this advantage, 
                                                      
1 For example, U.S. Census data shows that in 2015 sales tax revenues comprised 20% of tax revenues in 
D.C. and New York, but over 60% of total tax revenues in Washington. 
2 As Bruce and Fox (2000) note, an additional reason for declining sales tax revenues is a shift in consumer 
consumption away from tangible goods (generally subject to sales taxes) to services (in large part exempt 
from sales taxes), although the authors projected over $10 billion in sales tax revenue losses from online 
retail (e-tailing) alone. 
3 I refer to e-tailers throughout this manuscript as those classified as electronic retailers under the NAICS 
4541 definition who transact business exclusively via the Internet. Examples include Amazon and 
Overstock, and exclude the online division of traditional brick-and-mortar stores such as Wal-Mart and 
Target. 
4 Nexus means a “threshold” connection between a state and a business that must be met before a state can 
impose tax requirements on a business. Nexus exists separately for corporate income taxes and sales tax 
collections, the latter of which is discussed in Section II of this study. Throughout the remainder of this 
study, when I refer to nexus, I specifically mean nexus as it relates to a sales tax collection responsibility 
of a business (unless noted otherwise), which is not necessarily the same type of connection that creates 
corporate income tax nexus. 
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balance proximity to their consumer base with activities that would create nexus in a state 
(Bruce, Fox, and Luna, 2015). For instance, e-tailer Amazon initially planned to establish 
headquarters on a Native American reservation in California to be “close to talent without 
all the tax consequences”. However, once Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos realized this would 
not make Amazon immune to California nexus, the firm established its headquarters in 
Washington state to be close to California’s large market but avoid collecting sales taxes 
in the state (New York Times, 2009). 
 Traditional brick-and-mortar businesses, concerned by the competitive nexus 
advantage of e-tailers, have also taken note. Big-box retailers such as Wal-Mart and 
Target have joined with small businesses in the Alliance for Main Street Fairness to 
lobby for federal legislation aimed at addressing the lack of e-tailing nexus (Bustillo and 
Woo, 2011). Municipalities have even lobbied Congress to address this inequity in nexus, 
with the city of Dallas, Texas alone spending nearly half a million dollars on lobbying 
this issue between 2011 and 2014 (Railey, 2014). Further, when Amazon settled a 53 
million dollar lawsuit with Arizona in 2012 for unremitted sales tax collections, both the 
governor and the Arizona Retailers Association commented that requiring Amazon to 
collect sales taxes would “create an equal playing field” and give traditional brick-and-
mortar retailers “a chance at a fair fight” (Fischer, 2012). 
Limited by judicial interpretation and lack of federal legislation, states have, faute 
de mieux, only recently devised strategies to impose sales tax nexus on e-tailers. One 
approach, referred to as “click-through” nexus, involves enacting legislation requiring e-
tailers to collect sales tax if these e-tailers pay commissions to third-parties who reside in 
the state and refer sales to the e-tailers via weblinks on the third-party’s website (Bruce et 
 3 
al., 2015). Another approach, referred to as “look-through” nexus, involves disregarding 
the corporate structure of e-tailers to impose nexus on the parent entity (the entity through 
which the online sale is made) if the e-tailer has a physical subsidiary, generally a 
distribution center or warehouse, located in the state (Gordon, 2010). Both of the 
aforementioned strategies broaden the scope of sales tax nexus to encompass e-tail 
activity. As such, states likely realize larger sales tax collections after enforcing such 
broadened measures of sales tax nexus. However, e-tailers might cease their nexus 
creating activities after states broaden sales tax nexus, in which case states would not 
realize any change in sales tax collections. 
I explore these competing arguments by first analyzing sales tax collections at the 
state level to investigate whether strategies used to enforce a broadened definition of 
nexus to encompass e-tail activities, such as click-through and look-through nexus, result 
in greater sales tax collections. I find no evidence that enactment of click-through nexus 
laws result in greater sales tax collections. This is a likely finding, given the fact that e-
tailers have often ceased their click-through nexus creating activities following such 
legislation. However, I find that states enjoy 2.9 percent greater sales tax revenues when 
they enforce look-through nexus. This equates to an additional 27.1 million dollars in 
quarterly sales tax revenues in the average state. 
 Having provided evidence that sales tax revenues are larger after states enforce a 
broadened scope of nexus that includes e-tailing, I further investigate the source of these 
larger collections. Intuitively, if sales tax revenues are greater in periods after expanding 
nexus to include e-tailers, this likely results from additional taxes collected by e-tailers. 
Alternatively, an expansion of nexus to encompass e-tailers could cause e-tailers to lose 
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their competitive advantage, causing consumers to shift their consumption preferences 
from e-tail and toward local consumption. If so, the larger sales tax revenues would stem 
from additional business at local retailers, equating to a stronger, local retail industry. I 
investigate this alternative by analyzing the state equivalent of gross domestic product 
(state GDP, or GSP) from the retail sector in the presence of enforcing broadened nexus 
on e-tail. I find that state retail GDP is 2.4 percent greater after enforcing broader nexus 
rules. This equates to an average of approximately 79.7 million dollars in larger quarterly 
state retail GDP. Using the average sales tax rate in my sample of 5.6 percent, this result 
suggests that sales tax collections from this larger retail GDP are roughly 4.5 million, 
around 17 percent of the sales tax collections previously discussed. This suggests a partial 
shift in consumer preferences to local retail consumption after e-tailers are required to 
collect sales taxes. 
 As further evidence of the impact to the retail industry in a state after enforcement 
of broader sales tax nexus rules aimed at e-tailers, I investigate the number of physical e-
tailer establishments in states around the change in sales tax nexus. I find that the number 
of e-tailer establishments are approximately 7 percent lower after states enforce broader 
sales tax nexus rules.5 This result suggests that some e-tailers move their physical 
establishments out of states that enforce broader sales tax nexus rules, a strategy aimed at 
avoiding new sales tax nexus rules.  
 Finally, if local retail GDP is larger after enforcing a broadened scope of sales tax 
nexus to capture e-tailers, this could have spillover effects on income-based sources of 
                                                      
5 In untabulated analysis, I find that the number of establishments of traditional brick-and-mortar retailers 
remain no different after enforcement of broader sales tax nexus rules on e-tailers. 
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tax revenues. This result would manifest if local retailers experience larger sales and are 
obligated to pay income taxes on larger revenues. I investigate this by analyzing 
corporate income tax receipts in the presence of enforcing a broadened scope of sales tax 
nexus. I find that corporate income tax collections are 5.5 percent greater after enforcing 
broader sales tax nexus rules, suggesting a spillover effect from sales tax nexus within the 
corporate income tax regime. This equates to roughly 36 million dollars in greater 
corporate income tax collections per year. Given an average corporate income tax rate of 
7 percent, I would expect the larger state retail GDP to produce additional corporate 
income taxes of 22.3 million dollars. This amount accounts for over 60 percent of the 
larger corporate income tax collections I find. Additional evidence suggests that states 
more heavily emphasizing the sales factor in the corporate income tax apportionment 
formula realize even larger corporate income tax receipts after expanding the definition 
of sales tax nexus. 
 An emerging literature investigates the impact of tax authority monitoring on 
corporate income tax revenues at the federal (Hoopes, Mescall, and Pittman, 2016) and 
state (Gupta and Lynch, 2016) levels. I add to this literature by demonstrating that states 
enforcing broader sales tax nexus realize larger sales tax collections, arguably a more 
important revenue source for states (Robinson, 2012). Further, prior literature on 
consumer preferences in the presence of online sales tax collections tend to focus on only 
one retailer in only one state (Ellison and Ellison, 2009; Einav, Knoepfle, Levin, and 
Subdardesan, 2014). This study investigates the implications to preferences at the macro-
state level. This study also adds to the literature debating the implications of requiring 
online retailers to collect sales tax (Bruce and Fox, 2000; Goolsbee, 2000) in two ways. I 
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first provide complimentary evidence to Hoopes et al. (2016) and Baugh, Ben-David, and 
Park (2016) that e-tailers have a competitive advantage due to their lack of nexus. I then 
provide evidence that expanding sales tax nexus to include e-tail leads to a shift in 
consumer preferences to local consumption, and that this shift in preferences spills over 
into larger corporate income tax collections.  
 This study could be of interest to state policy makers considering enhancing 
enforcement of sales tax nexus to include e-tail. The null results for click-through nexus 
suggest that e-tailers have great flexibility in avoiding nexus under these laws, and the 
enactment of these laws may have a negligible impact on state finances. These same 
policy makers, however, could find a positive benefit if e-tailers do not cease their nexus-
creating activities under enforcement of broader nexus rules, as my results suggest that 
consumer preferences, in part, shift back to local, in-state consumption These results 
suggest that imposing a sales tax collection responsibility on e-tailers helps to “level the 
playing field” in regards to traditional brick-and-mortar businesses, which has a positive 
impact on local business revenues and a potential spillover effect on corporate income tax 
revenue. Finally, federal legislatures might find these results useful as they continue to 
debate legislation, such as the Marketplace Fairness Act, aimed at addressing online sales 
tax. 
 The next section provides an overview of sales and use tax in the U.S. along with 
sales tax issues created by the emergence of e-commerce. I then follow with motivation 
for the hypotheses in this study. After, I discuss the empirical designs used to tests these 
hypotheses and review the data used in my analyses. Following, I detail the results from 
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my multivariate analyses and additional sensitivity testing. Finally, I end this study with a 
conclusion. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Historical Background 
A sales tax, in its general form, is a tax on the intra-jurisdiction sale of goods and, 
in some instances, services. Typically, a sales tax is imposed on the consumer of final 
consumption. For this reason, purchases by business entities for goods that will be resold 
(i.e. inventory) or for items used in the manufacture of goods are exempt from a general 
sales tax. While the sales tax burden is generally borne by the end consumer, in the 
United States, the responsibility for collecting sales taxes and remitting the collections to 
state and local taxing jurisdictions is borne by the business entity selling the good.  
Taxing jurisdictions can only impose the collection and remittance responsibility 
of a general sales tax on business entities that have nexus with the jurisdiction. The 
determination of nexus is a legal question, discussed in detail below, that varies by state. 
Absent nexus, the burden of the sales tax does not disappear, but the remittance 
responsibility generally shifts to the consumer in the form of a use tax.6 The complement 
to a sales tax, a use tax is a tax on the consumption (i.e. “use” of) or storage of goods in 
the state, and is imposed by every state in the United States that imposes a sales tax (Fox, 
Luna, and Schaur, 2014). The use tax rate is equivalent to the sales tax rate. Compliance 
with the use tax is notoriously low, likely due to a lack of awareness of use tax 
                                                      
6 The theoretical basis of the use tax is to prevent the loss of sales tax revenues where consumers purchase 
goods and services from lower tax jurisdictions.  
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responsibility (Fox, Luna, Schaur, 2014). Due to limited auditing resources (Murray, 
1995), coupled with the inefficiency of auditing every potential consumer for use tax 
liability, states prefer to implement broad nexus-creating activities that peg responsibility 
for collecting and remitting taxes on as many business entities as possible. 
No federal statute defines what business activities create sales tax nexus. As such, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on numerous occasions that a state may impose sales 
tax nexus so long as doing so is not in violation of the Constitution’s 14th Amendment 
Due Process Clause or Article 1’s Commerce Clause (a non-exhaustive list is provided by 
Bruce et al., 2015). While the Court’s interpretation within these two clauses has changed 
over the years (see Gordon 2010), the de facto case governing sales tax nexus as it 
currently stands is Quill Corp v. North Dakota (Quill).7 Under Quill, a state may impose 
sales tax nexus on a business, and not violate the Due Process Clause, if the business has 
an economic presence in the state. However, given that Congress has the sole authority to 
regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, a business must have a 
physical presence within the state to create enough substantial nexus for the state to 
impose a sales tax collection burden. 
 The classic example of a business with an economic presence in a state, but 
without “physical” presence, is a mail-order business.8 Notably, the Supreme Court 
specifically bars states from imposing nexus on mail-order businesses as long as their 
                                                      
7 Quill Corp v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) 
8 The U.S. Census Bureau’s 2012 NAICS definition of a mail-order business (industry code 4541) include 
businesses “engaged in retailing…using nonstore means, such as [via] catalogs, toll free telephone 
numbers, or electronic media…” 
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only “connection with customers in the state is by common carrier or by mail” (National 
Bellas Hess)9.  
 
Emergence of E-tail 
Since the Quill decision, the mail-order industry has arguably changed in one 
significant way — the emergence of Internet retail (i.e. e-commerce). The U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Annual Retail Trade Survey from 1998 through 2014 documents a substantial 
increase in the amount of e-commerce. In 1998, approximately 5% of the mail-order 
industry was estimated to be from e-commerce, whereas by 2014 that ratio had increased 
to 66%. Further, only 0.2% of the 2.6 trillion in retail trade in 1998 was from e-
commerce; by 2014, e-commerce comprised nearly 6.5% of the 4.6 trillion in U.S. retail 
trade.10 
 Given the historical structure of e-tailers, most have the requisite physical 
presence to create substantial nexus as required by the Commerce Clause in only a few 
states. Researchers suggest that this lack of traditional nexus has contributed in part to 
declining sales tax bases among the states (Bruce and Fox, 2000; Goolsbee, 2000). Bruce 
et al. (2009) estimated that combined revenue losses from this decline totaled $7.7 billion 
in 2009 and projected it would reach $11.4 billion by 2012. 
 In 2008, New York enacted the first of its kind legislation aimed at curtailing 
revenue losses stemming from e-commerce. Termed click-through nexus, the New York 
statute established nexus for businesses that paid affiliates (i.e. independent contractors) 
                                                      
9 National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) 
10 https://www.census.gov/retail/index.html  
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commissions for referring customers to them via weblinks, if all such referrals totaled 
more than $10,000 in aggregate sales (Gordon 2010).11 For example, a tax blogger in 
New York who provides a link to Amazon for readers to use to purchase tax preparation 
software, and who receives commissions from each sale made by these “referrals”, would 
create click-through nexus in New York for Amazon. If aggregate sales from all of these 
click-through referrals totaled more than $10,000, the e-tailer would be required to collect 
sales taxes on all of its sales (not just these referral sales) in New York. 
 A separate avenue states have taken in an attempt to expand sales tax nexus to 
online retailers is to disregard the corporate structure of these businesses. Following 
Quill, brick-and-mortar businesses set up separate subsidiaries for the sole purpose of 
handling consumer Internet purchases, a term referred to as entity isolation (Gordon, 
2010). These businesses argued that even though they had retail storefronts in the state, 
Internet purchases were not subject to sales taxes because the online subsidiary through 
which the purchases were made did not have the physical presence necessary to create 
nexus. California successfully challenged this model in Borders Online, LLC v. State 
Board of Equalization, where the California Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
determined that since Borders, Inc. accepted returns and gave cash back to consumers 
who returned purchases made from Borders Online, LLC (the Internet subsidiary of 
Borders, LLC), Borders Online, LLC had sales tax nexus with California.12  
                                                      
11 The terms affiliate nexus (based on related party activities), attributional nexus (based on third-party 
activities, and click-through nexus (attributional nexus via weblinks) are generally used interchangeably 
(Bruce et al., 2015). I refer to click-through nexus to specifically refer to nexus created via third-party 
weblink referrals. 
12 Borders Online, LLC v. State Board of Equalization, 129 Cal. App. 4th 1179 (2005) 
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 E-tailers have pursued the reverse approach by structuring their distribution 
centers and research and development divisions in separate legal subsidiaries. Since e-
tailers do not have physical storefronts, they claim the physical presence of the separate 
subsidiaries does not create nexus for the parent company under Quill (Gordon, 2010). 
However, as Gordon (2010) notes, such forms of entity isolation are little different than 
in the Borders Online setting, because the physical presence of the subsidiary in a state is 
integral to the overall business structure and afford these e-tailers due process. 
 It appears that most states have agreed. While Gordon (2010) notes that states 
need only to change their nexus statutes to “look through” the corporate structure of 
online retailers, states in general have argued that their statutes already provide for such 
look-through nexus. For instance, in 2010 Texas sued Amazon for unremitted sales tax 
collections of $269 million from 2005 through 2009, arguing that existing nexus laws 
established nexus for Amazon (Ramsey, 2011). Likewise, the Pennsylvania Department 
of Revenue issued a general sales and use tax bulletin on December 1, 2011 noting that 
its existing nexus laws already encompassed businesses that had “...within this 
Commonwealth, either directly or through a subsidiary...[a] distribution house, sales 
house, warehouse... (Pennsylvania Department of Revenue, 2011)." 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 While it might seem obvious that sales tax collections should increase after states 
enforce a broadened scope of nexus (i.e. click-through or look-through), e-tailers can 
simply cease their nexus creating operations in a state. For instance, Amazon and 
Overstock joined in lawsuits against New York after enactment of its click-through nexus 
 12 
law. Although Amazon initiated sales tax collections in New York while litigating its 
claim, Overstock cancelled its referral program in New York and never initiated sales tax 
collections in New York. Further, before settling with the state of Texas, Amazon closed 
its warehouse in Texas to avoid creating future nexus in the state. However, there is a 
limit to how much activity an e-tailer is willing to avoid (Bruce et al., 2015) before it 
risks losing business. Therefore, I expect on average sales tax revenues to increase with 
enforcement of expanded nexus.13 My first hypothesis thus explores the impact of states 
enforcing an expanded definition of nexus to encompass e-tail activities. Specifically, I 
hypothesize: 
 
H1: Sales tax revenues are larger after states enforce a broadened scope of sales tax 
nexus to include e-tailers. 
 
 Whereas H1 relates to direct consequences of sales tax nexus issues, the 
remaining hypotheses look to potential indirect spillover effects from sales tax nexus. 
Given that consumers generally evade their use tax obligation from online purchases 
(Bruce and Fox, 2000; Bruce et al., 2015), all else equal, consumers should prefer to shop 
online if they do not have to pay sales tax. In fact, prior research documents that 
consumers are sensitive to e-tail sales tax collections. For example, Ellison and Ellison 
(2009) analyze sales for a single retailer with nexus only in California and find the 
retailer’s online sales are greater to consumers in states with higher home sales tax rates 
                                                      
13 It remains an empirical question how many dollars are still left on the table due to e-tailers ceasing some 
nexus-creating activities. 
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(for which the retailer did not collect the sales tax). Anderson, Fond, Simester, and 
Tucker (2009) find that Internet purchases drop significantly once a traditional retailer 
opens a store and creates nexus for its online sales (i.e. once the retailer starts to collect 
sales tax). Einav, Knoepfle, Levin, and Subdaresan (2014) look at eBay transactions and 
document a preference away from sellers obligated to collect sales taxes and toward those 
with no such obligation. Goolsbee (2000) provides evidence that, as sales tax rates 
increase, consumers are more likely to shift to purchasing online. He further presents 
calculations suggesting that, if sales taxes had been collected on online purchases, around 
30% of consumers would not have purchased online.14 
 More directly, Baugh, Ben-David, and Park (2016) use household-level data to 
investigate consumer spending after Amazon initiated sales tax collections in the states. 
The authors find a roughly 10% decrease in total Amazon purchases after Amazon 
initiates sales tax collections. This reduction is nearly tripled when examining large dollar 
item products only. While they find an increase in purchases at Newegg.com, an e-tail 
competitor, post-implementation, they are unable to detect a difference in purchasing at 
local Best Buy brick-and-mortar stores. The results suggest that consumers shift 
purchasing habits away from Amazon after Amazon initiates sales tax collections in the 
state of consumption, although it is unclear which other businesses (other e-tailers or 
traditional retailers) benefit. 
 While Baugh et al. (2016) find no difference in Best Buy purchases after Amazon 
initiates sales tax collections, their study is limited; they only study one retail sector (i.e. 
                                                      
14 Later studies by Alm and Melnik (2005) and Ballard and Lee (2007) temper the magnitude of these 
findings. 
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electronics) and only one brick-and-mortar store (i.e. Best Buy) after Amazon begins 
collecting sales tax.15 However, if states are able to remove the competitive sales tax 
nexus advantage from e-tailers, consumer preferences potentially shift back across all 
levels of local retail consumption. If consumer preferences shift to local retail 
consumption after enforcing broadened nexus on e-tailers, this would be reflected in 
greater retail GDP at the state level. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
H2a: State GDP from the retail sector is larger after states enforce a broadened scope of 
sales tax nexus to include e-tailers. 
 
Prior research also finds that e-tailers are sensitive to sales tax nexus. Bruce et al. 
(2015) find that although Internet retailers prefer to directly establish nexus in larger 
states in order to be closer to larger markets, this association diminishes as sales tax rates 
increase. Their results imply e-tailers face an inverse relation between the advantage of 
being physically close to consumers and the price advantage to not being obliged to 
collect sales tax. Hoopes et al. (2016) analyze stock returns around key dates related to 
the potential enactment of the Marketplace Fairness Act, which is designed to “level the 
playing field” between traditional retailers and e-tailers. They find a negative market 
response for e-tailers when the probability of legislative action increases, suggesting a 
previous competitive advantage for e-tailers that had been impounded into price. If e-
                                                      
15 Baugh et al. (2016) made this design choice because many of Amazon’s large competitors have a highly 
diversified product mix greater than that of Amazon (e.g. Target sells electronics, groceries, household 
goods, etc…). Analyzing only Best Buy and NewEgg allowed them to identify an effect on one 
comparative product line (i.e. electronics). 
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tailers are sensitive to collecting sales taxes from their customers, it is likely that e-tailers 
will flee states that impose a sales tax collection responsibility on them. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that:  
 
H2b: The number of e-tail establishments is lower after states enforce a broadened 
scope of sales tax nexus to include e-tailers.  
 
 If, following enforcement of an expanded definition of nexus to include e-tailers, 
consumer preferences shift from e-tailer purchasing to in-state brick-and-mortar retail 
shopping, there is potential for spillover effects to other state-level taxes. Notably, if local 
retailers experience greater revenues from a shift in purchasing preferences, they are 
likely to have larger profits subject to state income taxes. I thus hypothesize that:16 
 
H3: Corporate income tax revenues are larger after states enforce a broadened scope 
of sales tax nexus to include e-tailers. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
16 It is possible that enforcement of a broader definition of sales tax nexus to include e-tailers could 
spillover to e-tailer corporate income tax nexus. However, sales tax nexus does not necessarily equate to 
corporate income tax nexus. For instance, The Interstate Commerce Act of 1959 (commonly referred to 
as Public Law 86-27) specifically exempts businesses from income tax nexus if their only activity in a 
state is the solicitation of sales via employees or third-party contractors. Further, I am unaware of any 
direct evidence of states targeting e-tailers from a corporate income tax aspect. Regardless, if there are 
spillover effects, these would not change a directional expectation of H3; corporate income tax 
collections to the state would increase either way. 
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DESIGN 
Difference-in-difference Fixed Effect Model 
 Given that I am looking at policy changes, conventional wisdom suggests the use 
of a difference-in-difference (DID) design to test my hypotheses. A typical DID requires 
an indicator for treated states, a separate indicator for the treatment period, and an 
interaction of these two variables. The interaction is the variable of interest in such a 
model, denoting the impact of the policy in the treated states post-treatment. In my 
setting, states implement changes to sales tax nexus at different times. Thus, I am unable 
to create a single indicator for the treatment period. 
 To overcome this hurdle, I use a fixed effect model instead of a typical DID. This 
requires the inclusion of separate indicators for each state in my sample and separate 
indicators for each period (I use either quarterly or yearly data) in the sample. State and 
period fixed effects allow for staggered implementation of broadened e-tailer sales tax 
nexus policies across states, as suggested by Meyer (1995), Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan (2004), Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), and Amiram, Bauer, and Frank 
(2016).17 My variable of interest, which I denote in my models below as TREATED, is 
an indicator for periods in which states enforce broader nexus rules. This variable of 
interest is equivalent to the interaction term in a typical DID. 
 TREATED takes one of two specifications in my models. TREATED = CLICK is 
an indicator for periods in which states enforce click-through legislation. Ideally, I would 
use an ex-ante measure for look-through nexus, similar to CLICK. However, since look-
                                                      
17 I obtain similar results to model 1 when using a model similar to a traditional difference-in-difference 
approach (i.e. using one indicator for all “treated” states). 
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through nexus is a reinterpretation of existing law, I do not know the date in which states 
intend to enforce look-through nexus (i.e. there is no enactment date I can refer to). Thus, 
my next best option is to use an indicator for states that have required an e-tailer to 
collect sales tax if the e-tailer has a subsidiary (e.g. distribution center; warehouse; 
research and development center) with a physical location in the state. I use Amazon as 
this proxy, since Amazon is by far the largest e-tailer. Therefore, my second specification 
of TREATED is LOOK, an indicator for periods in which the state enforces look-through 
nexus, proxied for by states requiring Amazon to collect sales taxes due to Amazon 
having a subsidiary with a physical location in the state.18 
 A potential problem with my treated LOOK states arises from how I define my 
proxy using Amazon physical establishments in the states. What began as states imposing 
sales tax nexus on Amazon due to Amazon having a physical subsidiary in the state has, 
in recent years, morphed into Amazon expanding its physical distribution system into 
new states and simultaneously initiating sales tax collections in anticipation of states 
requiring them to do so. To address this, in all of my analyses, I run additional tests 
where I bifurcate my LOOK variable of interest into two components – those states 
where Amazon had a physical presence prior to the state imposing a sales tax collection 
responsibility on it (LOOKprior); and those states where Amazon initiated sales tax 
collections at the same time, or in anticipation of, establishing its first physical presence 
in a state (LOOKnoprior). LOOKprior is thus my best attempt at identifying those states 
where Amazon was exogenously required to initiate sales tax collections. 
                                                      
18 These two measures are not mutually exclusive; some states have both enacted click-through nexus laws 
and also impose look-through nexus on e-tailers. 
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 My treated CLICK and LOOK states act as their own control in my fixed effect 
difference-in-difference estimations. However, a difference-in-difference estimation also 
requires the use of control states that never change treatment across the sample period. I 
identify these control states in one of two ways, as discussed below. 
 My first approach in identifying a suitable control group of states is to look at 
states that border my treatment groups. The benefit of this approach is that my control 
group is not arbitrarily chosen and that bordering states are likely similar in many aspects 
to my treatment states, such as demographic mix, length of statehood, and so forth (Lee, 
Pesaran, and Smith 1997; Goff, Lebedinsky, and Lile 2012). I implement this approach 
by matching all states that border my treated CLICK and LOOK states so long as any 
potential border state imposes a sales tax and does not change its sales tax nexus rules 
across the matching period (i.e. both CLICK and LOOK must be zero across the match 
period). I refer to this as my Border Assigned samples.  
 My second approach to identifying a suitable control group of states is to 
randomly assign a state to my samples for each treated state.  The benefit of this approach 
is that I do not have to drop any treated states from my samples (which is possibility 
when matching on borders alone) and that randomized matching attempts to control for 
systematic differences within my control states. I implement this approach by assigning, 
for each treated state period, a control state that imposes a sales tax and does not change 
its sales tax nexus rules (both CLICK and LOOK must be zero across the match period), 
without replacement across each matching quarter-year. I refer to this as my Random 
Assigned samples. 
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Hypothesis 1 
 To test the impact on sales tax collections for states enforcing a broadened scope 
of sales tax nexus to encompass e-tail sales, I employ the following fixed effects model: 
 
STCs,q  = α + βTREATEDQs,q + γTAXs,q + δECONOMYs,q-1 + FEs + FEq + εs,q       (1) 
 
The dependent variable, STC, is the natural log of sales tax collections state s 
collects in quarter q. My variable of interest, TREATEDQ, is an indicator equal to 1 for 
all quarters q in which state s enforces a broadened scope of e-tail sales tax nexus, 
measured as either CLICK or LOOK as previously motivated. A positive coefficient on 
TREATEDQ would support H1 and indicate that sales taxes are larger after enforcing a 
broadened scope of e-tail nexus. 
TAX is a vector of covariates related to state policies on sales taxes. I include the 
sales tax rate at the beginning of the quarter (SRATE), which I anticipate to be positively 
associated with STC given that higher tax rates should yield larger collections. My 
control for the sales tax base is an indicator equal to 1 if the state taxes groceries at the 
beginning of q, 0 otherwise (GROCERY) — a tax on groceries is indicative of a broader 
tax base, thus I expect GROCERY to be positively related to STC. Finally, I include two 
variables to control for tax programs states enter into to raise tax revenues. AMNESTY_S 
is an indicator equal to 1 if the state has a tax amnesty that includes sales taxes at any 
point during q, 0 otherwise. While prior literature is mixed on the long-term efficacy of 
tax amnesty programs (Malik and Schwab, 1991; Alm and Beck, 1993), I would still 
expect periods of amnesty to at least temporarily increase tax revenues. SSUTA is an 
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indicator equal to 1 if the state is a member in the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement during quarter q, zero otherwise (Bruce et al., 2015).19  
ECONOMY is a vector of covariates related to the economic environment of the 
state. I include the natural log of wage income in the state from the prior quarter 
(WAGES) to control for both the amount of income available for consumption and the 
size of the economy.20 WAGES should be positively related to STC. Finally, I control for 
the health of the state economy by including the unemployment rate from the prior 
quarter (UNEMPLOY), which should be negatively related to STC (i.e. greater 
unemployment should indicate economic distress and thus a reduction in consumption). 
In addition to allowing for my staggered implementation of different sales tax 
nexus policies, the inclusion of quarter fixed effects should also control for any time 
trends across my sample period and seasonality in sales tax collection. Given the large 
variability in total sales taxes across states, coupled with consistent total sales taxes 
within state, I expect the inclusion of state fixed effects to dominate regression findings 
(with high explanatory power related to the inclusion of these fixed-effects).21  
                                                      
19 The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement is a joint venture by member states to simplify the 
administration of sales and use taxes, in an effort to reduce the burden multijurisdictional business face 
in complying with these taxes.  
20 I considered including two additional control variables for the size of the economy – the number of 
workers (measured quarterly from Census data) in the state and the total state population (estimated 
yearly from Census data). Both of these variables are highly and positively correlated with WAGES, 
thus, due to multicollinearity concerns, I did not include these additional variables in the analyses 
presented in this study. In sensitivity, when separately included with WAGES, I obtain similar results to 
the findings I present in this paper. 
21 Multicolinearity might also be a concern. I compute variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the variable of 
interest and covariates when I run model (1), and indeed find large VIFs (greater than 10) on the state 
fixed-effects in many instances. This alone should not be an issue given that I never find a VIF on my 
variable(s) of interest greater than 3 (O’brien, 2007). I will discuss this in greater detail when reporting 
regression results. 
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In addition to the fixed effects Model 1, I also utilize a changes model to test 
which quarter (if any) the impact of broadening sales tax nexus has on sales tax 
collections, as follows:  
 
ΔSTCs,q to q-8 = α + β(TREATEDQ1s,q … TREATEDQ8s,q) + γΔTAXs,q to q-8 
     + δΔECONOMYs,q-1 to q-9 + FEs + FEq + εs,q            (2) 
 
 STC and the vector TAX (vector ECONOMY) are as defined in Model 1, but instead 
of quarterly levels, these variables are the two-year change from q (q-1 for vector 
ECONOMY) to q-8 (q-9 for vector ECONOMY). My variables of interest are the eight 
quarterly indicators TREATEDQ1 to TREATEDQ8, which are individual indicators for the 
period since state s began enforcing the respective broadened scope of sales tax nexus. For 
instance, TREATEDQ1 is an indicator for the initial quarter of enforcing broadened sales tax 
nexus, TREATEDQ2 is an indicator for the quarter after the quarter of initiation of enforcing 
broadened sales tax nexus, and so forth. As in Model 1, TREATEDQ is separately specified 
in one of two ways – CLICK or LOOK. 
 
Hypothesis 2a 
I utilize a regression similar to Model 1 to explore the H2a impact on the state 
retail industry for a state enforcing a broadened scope of e-tailer sales tax nexus. This 
fixed effects Model 3 is as follows: 
 
GSPs,q  = α + βTREATEDQs,q + δECONOMYs,q-1 + FEs + FEq + εs,q              (3) 
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 The dependent variable GSP takes one of two values: GSP = RETAIL is the 
natural log of the quarterly state gross domestic product from the retail sector in state s, 
while GSP = MANUFACTURE is the natural log of the quarterly state gross domestic 
from the manufacturing sector (used to test the counterfactual that all industries are larger 
after enforcing broader sales tax nexus). TREATEDQ is as previously defined. A positive 
coefficient on TREATEDQ would support H2a and indicate that retail GDP is larger after 
states enforce broadened e-tail nexus. The vector ECONOMY still includes WAGES, 
now a control for the amount of employment income in the economy and 
UNEMPLOYMENT (as previously motivated). 
 Further, I utilize a changes model similar to Model 2 to test which quarter (if any) 
the impact of broadened sales tax nexus has on the retail sector, as follows: 
 
ΔRETAILs,q to q-8= α + β(TREATEDQ1s,q … TREATEDQ8s,q) + δΔECONOMYs,q-1 to q-9 
  + FEs + FEq + εs,q                (4) 
 
 RETAIL is as defined in Model 3, but instead of quarterly levels, it is the two-
year change from q to q-8. My variables of interest TREATEDQ1 through TREATEDQ8 
and vector ECONOMY are as defined in Model 2. As in all other models, TREATEDQ is 
separately specified in one of two ways – CLICK or LOOK. 
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Hypothesis 2b 
I utilize a regression similar to Model 3 to explore the H2b impact on the number 
of mail-order and e-tail establishments for a state enforcing a broadened scope of e-tailer 
sales tax nexus. This fixed effects Model 5 is as follows: 
 
ESTABs,q = α + βTREATEDQs,q + δECONOMYs,q-1 + FEs + FEq + εs,q              (5) 
 
 The dependent variable ESTAB is the natural log of the quarterly number of 
establishments in the NAICS subsector code 454 (mail-order and electronic realtors). 
TREATEDQ is as previously defined. A negative coefficient on TREATEDQ would 
support H2b and indicate that the number of e-tail physical locations is lower after states 
enforce broadened e-tail nexus. The vector ECONOMY still includes WAGES and 
UNEMPLOYMENT (both as previously motivated), along with PERC_RET, the ratio of 
state retail GDP as a percent of total state GDP. This latter variable controls for the likely 
positive relation of the total number of retail establishments in a state if the state’s 
economy relies more heavily on the retail sector. 
 Further, I utilize a changes model similar to Model 4 to test which quarter (if any) 
the impact of broadened sales tax nexus has on the retail sector, as follows: 
 
ΔESTABs,q to q-8 = α + β(TREATEDQ1s,q … TREATEDQ8s,q) + δΔECONOMYs,q-1 to q-9 
   + FEs + FEq + εs,q               (6) 
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 ESTAB is defined as in Model 5, but instead of quarterly levels, it is the two-year 
change from q to q-8. My variables of interest TREATEDQ1 through TREATEDQ8 and 
vector ECONOMY are as defined in Model 5, but now as two-year changes instead of 
levels. As in all other models, TREATEDQ is separately specified in one of two ways – 
CLICK or LOOK. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
I utilize a regression similar to Model 1 to explore the H3 impact on corporate 
income tax collections for states enforcing a broadened scope of e-tail sales tax nexus. 
Whereas I utilized quarterly data in Model 1 through 6, I use yearly data for my corporate 
income tax tests due to volatility in corporate income tax collection measures related to 
differences in how corporate entities choose to make their quarterly estimated tax 
payments.22 The fixed effects Model 7 is as follows: 
 
CITCs,y  = α + βTREATEDYs,y + γTAXs,y + δECONOMYs,y-1 + FEs + FEy + εs,y       (7) 
 
 CITC is the natural log of yearly corporate income tax collections for state s. 
TREATEDY and ECONOMY are as previously defined in Model 1 except on a yearly 
basis. A positive coefficient on TREATEDY would support H3 and indicate that 
corporate income taxes are larger following enforcement of broadened e-tail sales tax 
nexus. The vector TAX now contains the following covariates: the highest marginal 
corporate income tax rate for the year (CRATE), which should be positively associated 
                                                      
22 When I test results using quarterly data, I find similar inferences to those I find using yearly measures. 
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with CIT — higher tax rates should raise greater taxes; the highest marginal corporate 
income tax bracket (BRACKET), which should be negatively associated with CIT — a 
higher marginal bracket denotes income in lower brackets taxed at lower marginal rates; 
an indicator for states with a sales apportionment factor greater than 0.50 (SFACTOR), 
which is likely positively associated with CITC — this is a control for the origin- versus 
destination-based factors of the corporate income tax (Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000); and 
an indicator equal to one if the state had a tax amnesty that included corporate income 
taxes at any point during the year (AMNESTY_C), zero otherwise – likely positively 
related to CIT. 
 Further, I utilize a changes model similar to Model 1 to test which year (if any) 
the impact of broadened sales tax nexus has on corporate income tax collections, as 
follows: 
 
ΔCITCs,y to y-2 = α + β(TREATEDY1s,y … TREATEDy3s,y) + γΔTAXs,y to y-2 
     + δΔECONOMYs,y-1 to y-3 + FEs + FEy + εs,y            (8) 
 
 CITC and the vector TAX (vector ECONOMY) are as defined in Model 7, but 
instead of yearly levels, these variables are the two-year change from y (y-1 for vector 
ECONOMY) to y-2 (y-3 for vector ECONOMY). My variables of interest are the three 
yearly indicators TREATEDY1 to TREATEDY3, which are individual indicators for the 
period since state s began enforcing the respective broadened scope of sales tax nexus. For 
instance, TREATEDY1 is an indicator for the initial year of enforcing broadened sales tax 
nexus, TREATEDY2 is an indicator for the year after the year of initiation of enforcing 
 26 
broadened sales tax nexus, and so forth. As in all other models, TREATEDY is separately 
specified in one of two ways – CLICK or LOOK. 
 
DATA 
The Appendix defines all variables used in this study and indicates the data 
sources used to construct each variable. In general, I obtain state level tax collections 
from the U.S. Census Bureau. This state level tax collection data is directly provided by 
each state’s revenue agency and is verified by the Census using each state’s 
comprehensive annual financial reports when necessary. State-level GDP data is from the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).23 I generally hand collect the TAX control 
variables and verify, when available, by using third-party sources found in prior 
literature. I obtain ECONOMY control variables from the BEA and U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
 Column 1 of Table 1 shows that, starting with New York in the second quarter of 
2008, 20 states have adopted click-through sales tax nexus rules as of the end of 2015. I 
require two years of treatment observations in my analyses to allow the potential impact 
of click-through nexus rules a chance to materialize in the data. Thus, only states that 
adopted click-through nexus through 2013 are considered “treated” in my analyses where 
CLICK is my variable of interest, which are the first 12 states reported in column 1. 
 
                                                      
23 The BEA computes state-level retail GDP using the income approach. Specifically, this number includes 
wages and salaries from NAICS industries 44 and 45 (retailers) compiled by the BEA, business taxes 
(excluding corporate income taxes) compiled by the Census, self-employment retailer gross operating 
surplus (in essence, net income before taxes) compiled by the BEA, and an allocation of national non-
self employment retailer operating surplus using both BEA and Census data.  
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 Column 2 of Table 1 shows that, starting with Texas in the third quarter of 2012, 
19 states have adopted look-through sales tax nexus rules as of the end of 2015.24 Similar 
to my click-through nexus identification, I require two years of treatment observations in 
my analyses to allow the potential impact of look-through nexus rules a chance to 
materialize in the data. Thus, only states that adopted look-through nexus through 2013 
are considered “treated” in my analyses where LOOK is my variable of interest, which 
are the first ten states reported in column 2. 
Table 2 reports the average percent of total tax revenues each state relied on from 
2005 to 2015. The results underlie one of the motivations of this study. The average state 
collects nearly one-third of its total taxes from a general sales tax, and this number jumps 
to nearly one-half of total taxes if excise taxes are included.25 Conversely, the average 
state only relies on the corporate income tax for roughly 6% of total tax revenues. Not 
tabulated, I further find that the individual yearly state breakouts of tax revenues are 
largely consistent across my sample period. There is, however, a noticeable decrease in 
sales tax collections across the sample period, in line with expectations from prior 
research on declining sales taxes (Bruce and Fox, 2000; Bruce et al., 2009). 
Table 2 shows that 5 states (Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and 
Oregon) did not impose a general sales tax across my sample period, leaving 46 states 
(including the District of Columbia) with potential sales tax data for this study. Further, 
                                                      
24 This table only lists states that changed their sales tax nexus during my potential sample period for which 
data is available – 2005 through 2015. Amazon has collected sales taxes in four states (Kansas, Kentucky, 
North Dakota, and Washington) prior to my sample period. 
25 An excise tax is simply a specific sales tax rate on a designated item (common examples are alcohol 
taxes, cigarette taxes, motor fuel taxes, and hotel room taxes) in lieu of the normal general sales tax rate. I 
do not include excise taxes in my analyses, although use tax avoidance can occur on any tangible item 
subject to an excise tax (Asplund, Friberg, and Wilander, 2007; Goolsbee, Lovenheim, and Slemrod, 
2010). 
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four states (Nevada, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming) do not impose a corporate 
income tax based on net income across my sample period.26 Thus, I remove Texas and its 
control state from my look-through sample and disallow the other three states as potential 
controls for my tests where CITC is my variable of interest. In addition, I remove 
Michigan and Ohio as potential CITC control states because at certain points in my 
sample period these two states did not impose a corporate income tax based on net 
income. 
Table 3 reports univariate statistics for the samples used in my multivariate 
analyses. The first columns of statistics reported in both panels are for the Border 
Assigned sample, while the second columns of statistics reported in both panels are for 
the Random Assigned sample. Panel A reports the statistics for my tests where CLICK is 
my variable of interest. Both samples appear to be descriptively similar. The potential 
number of quarterly (yearly) observations for Random Assigned is 384 (120). The actual 
sample is slightly smaller due to the random inclusion of South Carolina as a control state 
for two separate treated states (i.e. part of South Carolina overlaps with two different 
treatment periods). Panel B reports the statistics for my tests where LOOK is my variable 
of interest. Both samples appear to be descriptively similar, although the average state in 
my Random Assigned sample is slightly larger than in the Border Assigned sample (the 
difference in quarterly WAGES is roughly four billion dollars). The potential number of 
quarterly (yearly) observations for Random Assigned is 320 (100).  Because there is no 
                                                      
26 South Dakota does not have a general corporate income tax. However, the Census treats some of South 
Dakota’s taxes (i.e. bank franchise tax) as corporate income tax because the tax base is net income. I 
include South Dakota in my corporate income tax tests. Inferences remain unchanged if I exclude South 
Dakota. 
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overlap in the random inclusion of the control states, my quarterly observations are 320. 
The yearly observations used for my CITC tests are only 90 because Texas does not have 
a corporate income tax based on net income, thus it and its random control state are 
removed from the CITC analyses. 
Table 4 reports the Pearson correlation matrices for the samples used in my 
analyses. Panel A reports the correlations for the samples where CLICK is my variable of 
interest, while Panel B reports the correlations for the samples where LOOK is my 
variable of interest. The upper right corner of each matrix in both panels is for the Border 
Assigned sample, while the lower left corner of each matrix in both panels is for the 
Random Assigned sample. Unsurprisingly, levels data associated with state size have 
positively high correlations (i.e. the levels variables of STC, WAGES, RETAIL, ESTAB, 
and CITC) across all panels. In Panel A, CLICK is positively associated with STC 
(potential support for H1), RETAIL (potential support for H2a), ESTAB (opposite 
support for H2ba, although this test is based on physical presence of the e-tail and thus is 
unlikely to be associated with changes in number of e-tail establishments in a state), and 
CITC (potential support for H3). In Panel B, LOOK is positively associated with STC 
(potential support for H1), RETAIL (potential support for H2a), ESTAB, although this 
correlation is insignificantly different from zero (potential support for H2b), and CITC 
(potential support for H3). 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
H1 – Impact of broadened sales tax nexus on sales tax collections 
 Table 5 reports the results of Model 1, which tests my hypothesized (H1) 
association between sales tax collections and states enforcing a broadened scope of e-tail 
sales tax nexus. The sample identification strategy in column 1 across all panels is Border 
Assigned, while the sample identification strategy in column 2 across all panels is 
Random Assigned. The variable of interest in Panel A is the indicator for periods in 
which states enforce click-through nexus (CLICK). Neither of the coefficients on CLICK 
in either sample are significant. This is consistent with anecdotes that many e-tailers 
abandoned their nexus creating activities (i.e. soliciting sales through third-party affiliate 
websites) after enactment of click-through nexus laws. Thus, I find no support for H1 
when I define enforcement of broader e-tail sales tax nexus as enactment of click-through 
nexus laws. 
  The variable of interest in Panel B is the indicator for periods in which states 
enforce look-through nexus (LOOK). LOOK is marginally significant in both samples, 
providing some evidence in support of H1 that sales tax collections are larger for periods 
in which states enforce look-through nexus. I explore this finding further in Panel C, 
where the LOOK variable of interest is bifurcated into its two components: an indicator 
for those states where Amazon had a physical presence prior to the state imposing a sales 
tax collection responsibility on it (LOOKprior); and an indicator for those states where 
Amazon initiated sales tax collections concurrent with, or in anticipation of, establishing 
its first physical presence in a state (LOOKnoprior).  
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  The coefficient on LOOKprior is positive and significant across both samples, 
while the coefficient on LOOKnoprior is positive but insignificant in both. This result 
suggests that sales tax collections are larger in states that enforce look-through nexus, but 
only if the state has e-tailers with a physical presence in the state prior to enforcement. 
When considering my proxy for LOOK (i.e. Amazon’s physical presence), a possible 
explanation for this finding could be that the threat of enforcement of expanded sales tax 
nexus is only credible if Amazon is subsequently compelled by the state to collect sales 
taxes (i.e. the state is actively pursuing enforcement of broader nexus). Conversely, for 
LOOKnoprior, the threat of enforcement is likely not credible because Amazon might 
have initiated sales tax collections without compulsion from the state (i.e. the state may 
not being acting on this). In economic magnitude, when looking at the result for the 
Random Assigned sample, the coefficient of 0.029 on LOOKprior suggests that quarterly 
sales tax collections are approximately 2.9 percent larger when credibly enforcing look-
through nexus. This implies approximately 27.1 million dollars in larger sales tax 
collections per quarter.27 
 Together, the results from Table 5 suggest that the passage of click-through nexus 
laws, on their own, is not enough for states to see larger sales tax revenues. This is likely 
due to the relative ease of e-tailers to abandon their third-party solicitations creating 
click-through nexus (a common strategy e-tailers such as Amazon and Overstock 
employed in many states initiating click-through nexus laws). However, sales tax 
revenues are larger for states successful in credibly imposing a sales tax collection 
responsibility on e-tailers via look-through nexus. 
                                                      
27 (e0.029 – 1) * 934 million in average quarterly sales tax collections in the sample 
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 Table 6 reports the results of Model 2, which explores the timing of the results 
previously presented in Table 5. Similar to Table 5, the sample utilized in column 1 
across all panels is Border Assigned, while the sample utilized in column 2 across all 
panels is Random Assigned. The variables of interest in panel A are the eight quarterly 
indicators for click-through nexus (CLICKQ1 through CLICKQ8), where CLICKQ1 is 
the first quarter of enforcing click-through nexus, CLICKQ2 is the second quarter of 
enforcing click-through nexus, and so forth. Across both samples, I only find positively 
marginal significance once in each sample, consistent with the null results in my levels 
analysis for click-through nexus. 
 The variables of interest in Panel B are the eight quarterly indicators for look-
through nexus (LOOKQ1 through LOOKQ8), where LOOKQ1 is the first quarter of 
enforcing look-through nexus, LOOKQ2 is the second quarter of enforcing look-through 
nexus, and so forth. The results between the two samples are consistent with the findings 
from the levels analyses, but are somewhat mixed on the timing of the significant larger 
sales tax collections. However, the results when bifurcating LOOK into its two 
components LOOKprior and LOOKnoprior in Panel C are more consistent in the timing 
of the impact of look-through nexus on sales tax collections. Specifically, the coefficients 
on the eight LOOKQprior indicators suggest that sales tax collections are larger in a 
couple of the quarters (Q1 through Q4) of the first year of enforcing look-through nexus, 
while consistently showing that sales tax collections are larger in the latter quarters (Q5 
through Q8) of enforcing look-through nexus. I do not find consistently compelling 
results on LOOKQnoprior, and thus suppress the coefficients in Table 6 for brevity. In 
short, the results for look-through nexus are consistent with H1, suggesting that states 
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credibly enforcing look-through nexus have somewhat larger sales tax collections in the 
first four quarters of enforcement, and consistently larger sales tax collections in the next 
four quarters of enforcement. 
 
H2a – Impact of broadened sales tax nexus on gross state product 
 The results on LOOK in Tables 5 and 6 could be due to e-tailers collecting and 
remitting sales taxes, or it could be due to consumers shifting consumption preferences to 
local consumption after e-tailers lose their competitive sales tax nexus advantage (and as 
such, the larger sales tax collections are from local retailers remitting larger sales taxes 
from an increase in sales). Tables 7 and 8 investigate these competing explanations, 
reporting the tests of H2a. 
 Table 7 reports the results of Model 3, which tests my hypothesized (H2a) 
association between state level GDP from the retail sector and states enforcing a 
broadened scope of e-tail sales tax nexus. The sample identification strategy in columns 1 
and 3 across all panels is Border Assigned, while the sample identification strategy in 
columns 2 and 4 across all panels is Random Assigned. The dependent variable in 
columns 1 and 2 across all panels is the natural log of quarterly state GDP from the retail 
sector (RETAIL). A positive and significant coefficient on the variables of interest would 
suggest that the local retail industry is stronger after enforcing broader sales tax nexus 
encompassing e-tailers. This would suggest a potential shift in consumer preferences 
towards local consumption, implying that at least part of the larger sales tax collections 
after expanding sales tax nexus is attributed to local retailers experience larger sales and 
remitting a greater level of sales taxes on these sales. The dependent variable in columns 
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3 and 4 across all panels is the natural log of quarterly state GDP from the manufacturing 
industry (MANUFACTURE). An insignificant result on this variable of interest would 
support H2a, suggesting that the retail industry is stronger due to enforcing broader sales 
tax nexus, and not due to a stronger economic environment overall. 
 The variable of interest in Panel A is CLICK. Consistent with the null results 
from my H1 tests, I do not find significance across any specification on this variable. 
Further, the variable of interest in Panel B is LOOK. Similar to Panel A, I do not find 
significance on this variable of interest, a surprising result given the significance I find on 
LOOK for H1. However, in Panel C, where I bifurcate LOOK into LOOKprior and 
LOOKnoprior, I find significance across both samples on LOOKprior only when my 
dependent variable is RETAIL. This result is consistent with H2a and aids in interpreting 
the results from H1. Specifically, this finding suggests that the local retail industry is 
larger after states credibly enforce look-through nexus on e-tail. In economic magnitude, 
when looking at the Random Assigned sample where the dependent variable is RETAIL, 
the positive coefficient of 0.024 on LOOKprior suggests that the state retail GDP is 2.4 
percent larger after credibly enforcing look-through nexus. This implies approximately 
79.7 million dollars in greater retail GDP.28 Using the average sales tax rate of 5.6 
percent for this sample specification, I would expect the sales tax collections from this 
larger retail GDP to be 4.5 million dollars, roughly 17 percent of the larger sales tax 
collections inferred from my Model 1. My result suggests a partial shift in consumer 
preferences towards local consumption after e-tailers are required to collect sales taxes. 
My 17 percent finding is higher than the 6 to 10 percent decrease in online purchasing 
                                                      
28 (e0.024 – 1) * 3,319.2 million in average quarterly state GDP from retail in the sample. 
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estimated to occur if e-tailers were required to collect sales taxes (Alm and Melnik 2005), 
but smaller than the 24 to 30 percent estimate suggested by Goolsbee (2000). 
 It could be that the result of increasing state retail GDP following enforcement of 
a broadened scope of e-tailer sales tax nexus is due to a healthier state economy in 
general and not from a shift in consumer preferences to local consumption. The results 
from columns 3 and 4 of Panel C, where the dependent variable is MANUFACTURE, 
contrasts with this explanation. Specifically, the insignificant coefficient on 
MANUFACTURE in both sample specifications suggest that the results in column 1 and 
2 are not driven by overall better economies in states that broaden the scope of sales tax 
nexus to include e-tailers, strengthening the likelihood that consumers are shifting from 
online shopping to traditional brick-and-mortar local consumption. Overall, my results 
are consistent with the findings from Baugh et al. (2016); consumer preferences partially 
shift to local consumption after states enforce look-through nexus. I therefore find 
support for H2a, but only when states credibly enforce look-through nexus. 
 Table 8 reports the results of Model 4, which explores the timing of the results 
previously presented in Table 7. Given that I did not previously find significant results on 
MANUFACTURE (further confirming H2a), my dependent variable across Table 8 is 
only RETAIL. Similar to Table 7, the sample utilized in column 1 across all panels is 
Border Assigned, while the sample utilized in column 2 across all panels is Random 
Assigned. The variables of interest in Panel A are the eight quarterly indicators for click-
through nexus (CLICKQ1 through CLICKQ8). Across both samples, I only find 
positively marginal significance once in only my Border Assigned sample, consistent 
with the null results in my levels analysis for click-through nexus. 
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 The variables of interest in Panel B are the eight quarterly indicators for look-
through nexus (LOOKQ1 through LOOKQ8). Similar to Table 7, I do not find 
compelling results on these variables across either sample. However, when bifurcating 
LOOK into its two components LOOKprior and LOOKnoprior in Panel C, I find results 
consistent with my previous results. Specifically, the coefficients on the eight 
LOOKQprior indicators suggest that state GDP from retail is almost immediately larger 
(LOOKQ2prior and on report significance) when states credibly enforce look-through 
nexus. Similar to my H1 tests, I do not find consistently compelling results on 
LOOKQnoprior, and thus suppress the coefficients in Table 8 for brevity. Overall, the 
results for look-through nexus are consistent with H2a, suggesting that states credibly 
enforcing look-through nexus have larger retail GDP and that they experience these 
results relatively quickly. 
 
H2b – Impact of broadened sales tax nexus on e-tail establishments 
 As further evidence on the relation of expanding sales tax nexus for e-tailers, I 
examine the potential impact to e-tail establishments in a state enforcing broader nexus 
rules. Table 9 reports the results of Model 5, which tests the H2b association between the 
number of NAICS subsector code 454 (which includes mail-order and electronic 
retailers) establishments and states enforcing a broadened scope of e-tail sales tax nexus. 
The sample identification strategy in column 1 across all panels is Border Assigned, 
while the sample identification strategy in column across all panels is Random Assigned. 
The dependent variable is the natural log of the number of quarterly mail-order and 
electronic retail establishments (ESTAB). A negative and significant coefficient on the 
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variables of interest would suggest that the number of physical e-tail establishments is 
lower after enforcing broader sales tax nexus on e-tailers. This would suggest that e-
tailers shift their physical locations out of states when states attempt to impose a sales tax 
collection responsibility on them. 
 The variable of interest in Panel A is CLICK. Consistent with the null results 
from the previous four tests, I do not find significance across any specification on this 
variable. This is not surprising, since this test is meant to test the relation for physical 
locations in a state and sales tax nexus, a relation that likely does not exist for the affiliate 
programs implied with CLICK. This null result provides support for H2b – I do not find 
results in a setting where I do not expect this relationship to exist. 
 The variable of interest in Panel B is LOOK. I find a negative and significant 
relation between LOOK and ESTAB across both sample identifications. This suggests 
that e-tailers reduce their physical locations in states imposing a sales tax collection 
responsibility on them due to having a physical presence in the state. I interpret this as 
suggesting that e-tailers are sensitive to having to collect sales taxes from their 
consumers. As further evidence of this finding, I bifurcate LOOK into its two 
components, LOOKprior and LOOKnoprior, in Panel C. I find highly significant and 
negative results on LOOKprior in both samples, and only a marginally significant and 
negative result in one sample for LOOKnoprior. This result suggests that e-tailers 
abandon their physical presence in a state when the state credibly imposes look-through 
nexus on them. The coefficient of -0.073 on LOOKprior in the Random Assigned sample 
suggests that NAICS subsector 454 physical establishments are 7 percent lower after 
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states credibly enforce look-through nexus.29 Overall, these results are consistent with 
H2b for look-through nexus rules. 
 Table 10 reports the results of Model 6, which explores the timing of the results 
previously present in Table 9. Similar to Table 9, the sample utilized in column 1 across 
all panels is Border Assigned, while the sample utilized in column 2 across all panels is 
Random Assigned. The variables of interest in Panel A are the eight quarterly indicators 
for click-through nexus (CLICKQ1 through CLICKQ8). For my Border Assigned 
sample, I find a marginally negative result on CLICKQ1 only, while for my Random 
Assigned sample I find marginally positive results on CLICKQ7 and CLICKQ8. These 
results do not provide compelling evidence in support of H2b, consistent with the 
previous results presented for CLICK. 
 The variables of interest in Panel B are the eight quarterly indicators for look-
through nexus (LOOKQ1 through LOOKQ8). Similar to Table 9, I find compelling 
results on these variables across both samples. The timing and significance of these 
results, however, vary. When bifurcating LOOK into its two components LOOKprior and 
LOOKnoprior in Panel C, I find results consistent with my previous results. Specifically, 
the coefficients on the eight LOOKQprior indicators suggest that the number of e-tailer 
physical establishments is almost immediately lower (LOOKQ2prior and after) when 
states credibly enforce look-through nexus. Similar to my H1 and H2a tests, I suppress 
the results for LOOKnoprior, although I find varying marginally negative results across 
several quarters on these coefficients. In short, the results for look-through nexus are 
                                                      
29 Given that my proxy is Amazon having and in many instances increasing (i.e. not reducing) a physical 
presence in states enforcing look-through nexus, this result should be interpreted as an overall net 
decrease in e-tail establishments. 
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consistent with my prior findings, suggesting that e-tailers relatively immediately shift 
their physical locations out of states credibly enforcing look-through nexus. 
 
H3 – Spillover effect on corporate income tax 
 Table 10 reports the results of Model 7, which explores the hypothesized (H3) 
association between corporate income tax collections with respect to states enforcing a 
broadened scope of e-tailer sales tax nexus. The dependent variable across all panels is 
yearly corporate income tax collections in the state (CITC). The sample identification in 
columns 1 and 2 is Border Assigned, while the sample identification in columns 3 and 4 
is Random Assigned. The variable of interest in Panel A is the indicator for years when a 
state enforces click-through nexus (CLICK). Given the null results from all of my 
previous tests on this variable, I do not expect, nor do I find, significant results anywhere 
on CLICK in Panel A. 
 The variable of interest in Panel B is the indicator for years when a state enforces 
look-through nexus (LOOK). The positive and significant coefficients in both sample 
identifications in columns 1 and 3 suggest that corporate income tax collections are larger 
after states enforce look-through nexus. Given that there is variation in how states arrive 
at corporate income that is subject to income tax, I explore a supplemental analysis of 
these results. In general, states do not require business entities to keep separate 
accounting records for operations in every state. Rather, states determine the amount of 
business income taxable in the state by using a formula that compares the amount of 
property, payroll, and sales in a state to the total business property, payroll, and sales (see 
Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000). States are free to emphasize each of these three “factors” 
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differently. Therefore, states that place a heavier weight on the sales factor “apportion” 
total business income more so on the basis of revenues in the state as opposed to 
investment in the state (business property and employment). Thus, it is probable that 
states that emphasize the sales factor will see a significantly larger amount of corporate 
income taxes due to an increase in the in-state retail sector. 
 To test this, I interact LOOK with SFACTOR, my control indicator for states that 
have a sales apportionment factor above 0.50. A positive and significant result on the 
interaction would suggest that states with a sales factor in excess of 50 percent see even 
larger corporate income tax collections due to an increase in in-state retail GDP. The 
results of these augmented tests are reported in columns 2 and 4. As expected, I find a 
positive and significant coefficient on the interaction, along with a positive and 
significant coefficient on the main variable of interest, across both samples. This suggests 
that states that more heavily emphasize the sales factor when apportioning corporate 
income taxes realize even larger corporate income tax collections when enforcing look-
through nexus. 
 As with my other tests, I further bifurcate LOOK into its two components – 
LOOKprior and LOOKnoprior. The results of this supplement test are reported in Panel 
C. I find a positive and significant coefficient on LOOKprior in both sample 
identifications. When analyzing my Random Assigned sample, the significant 0.054 
coefficient on LOOKprior suggests that yearly corporate income tax collections are 5.5 
percent larger in states that credibly enforce look-through nexus. This implies larger  
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corporate income tax collections of 36 million dollars each year in such states.30 Given 
the 79.7 million dollar for retail GDP for H2a, and the average corporate income tax rate 
of 7 percent in this sample, I would expect corporate income tax collections from larger 
retail sales to be roughly 22.3 million dollars each year. Thus, my result implies that 
approximately 62 percent of the larger corporate income tax collections I find are due to 
states credibly enforcing look-through nexus. 
 Table 12 reports the results of Model 8, which explores the timing of the results 
previously present in Table 11. Similar to Table 11, the sample utilized in column 1 
across all panels is Border Assigned, while the sample utilized in column 2 across all 
panels is Random Assigned. The variables of interest in Panel A are the three yearly 
indicators for click-through nexus (CLICKY1 through CLICKY3). As expected, I do not 
find significant results. 
 The variables of interest in Panel B are the three yearly indicators for look-
through nexus (LOOKY1 through LOOKY3). Across both sample identifications, I find 
positive and significant results only on LOOKY3, suggesting that it is not until the 
second year after enforcing look-through nexus that states realize larger corporate income 
tax collections. Further, when bifurcating these variables of interest into LOOKYprior 
and LOOKYnoprior in Panel C, I only find significant results on LOOKY3prior, 
suggesting that it is only when states credibly enforce look-through nexus that they 
eventually realize a spillover effect in the corporate income tax regime. 
 
 
                                                      
30 (e0.054 – 1) * 654.9 million in average yearly corporate income tax collections in the sample. 
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SENSITIVITY 
Whereas I separately analyze the impact of click-through nexus legislation and 
enforcement of look-through nexus as different attempts to impose sales tax nexus on e-
tailers, I also consider instances where states were successful in collecting sales tax from 
e-tailers via both methods. To analyze this, I include both LOOK and CLICK in the same 
models presented in this paper. My inferences with this proxy are similar to my 
inferences obtained from my look-through nexus analyses – I find my hypothesized 
results only on credible enforcement of look-through nexus.  
A concern with my Border Assigned sample is that is does not properly identify 
states with the same economic size, while a concern with my Random Assigned sample is 
that it does not properly identify control states with similar economic conditions. To 
assuage these concerns, I create an additional sample that combines the logic from these 
two separate samples. Specifically, I implement this approach by assigning, for each 
treated state period, a control state that imposes a sales tax and does not change is sales 
tax nexus (both CLICK and LOOK must be zero across the match period), that borders 
the treated state, and is within the same interquartile size as the treated state, similar to 
the approach utilized by Goff et al. (2012). Under this approach, California, Connecticut, 
and Maine for my CLICK analyses do not have suitable control states, while California 
and Texas do not have suitable control states for my LOOK analyses. Even so, when 
utilizing this sample in sensitivity analyses, I obtain similar results (albeit somewhat 
weaker) to those presented in this study. 
 My findings for sales taxes and corporate income taxes could be related to the 
overall health or growth of states that enforce a broadened scope of e-tailer sales tax 
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nexus. If so, I should expect to see increases in other state taxes. I analyze gasoline excise 
taxes as a dependent measure in the models presented in this paper, with the same 
ECONOMY controls and TAX controls aimed specifically at the gas excise tax (namely, 
the excise tax rate). I do not find any significance on my LOOK variables of interest 
when analyzing gas excise taxes in the presence of a enforcing an expanded definition of 
nexus to include e-tailers, mitigating concerns that my results reflect an increasing trend 
in all tax collections. 
 The results for my corporate income tax tests could be due to changes to the 
corporate income tax regime in a state after also enhancing the scope of sales tax nexus to 
include e-tailers. If so, the increases to corporate income taxes I report could be to states 
more heavily taxing corporations, and not from increases in in-state consumption as I 
suggest. To investigate this potential alternative explanation, I replace CITC as the 
dependent variable in models 7 and 8 and replace with the TAX measures CRATE, 
BRACKET, and SFACTOR. This allows me to test whether changes in enforcement of 
broader e-tailer sales tax nexus are related to changes in the structure of the state’s 
corporate tax system. I do not find a positive association between these measures and my 
LOOK variables of interest, suggesting that the corporate income tax regime is not 
differentially changing for states enhancing their sales tax nexus to include e-tailers to 
those that are not.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 The past two decades have seen explosive growth in e-commerce — from roughly 
5 billion at the turn of the century to over 300 billion in 2015. At the same time, the 
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limitations of Quill on the ability of states to impose a sales tax collection responsibility 
on much of this e-commerce, coupled with low consumer use tax compliance has 
contributed to a decline in sales tax revenues — an estimated 11.4 billion dollars were 
lost to e-commerce in 2012 alone. This study investigates the impact of recent 
enforcement of broadened sales tax nexus meant to impose a sales tax collection 
responsibility on e-tailers. 
 My results suggest that sales tax revenues are larger when states credibly enforce 
broader sales tax nexus rules that include e-tailing (as evidenced by my significant results 
for states enforcing look-through nexus on e-tailers) but only if e-tailers do not abandon 
the nexus-creating activities under the broader scope (as evidenced by my null results for 
states enacting click-through nexus laws). Additional tests find that state GDP from retail 
is larger after the credible enforcement of broadened sales tax nexus that encompasses e-
tailing, suggesting that consumers shift their preferences to in-state consumption after e-
tailers lose their competitive advantage by not collecting sales taxes on behalf of their 
consumers. Further, the number of e-tail establishments in a state credibly enforcing 
look-through nexus is lower, implying that e-tailers are sensitivity to collecting sales 
taxes and will abandon physical locations in an attempt to not collect these taxes. Finally, 
I offer evidence that this shift in preferences has a positive spillover effect on in-state 
business receipts, where larger local business leads to larger corporate income tax 
revenues in states credibly enforcing expanded sales tax nexus. 
 These results are subject to a couple caveats. First, my results for enforcing look-
through nexus on e-tailers are based on dates that states require Amazon to collect sales 
tax due to a subsidiary with a physical location in the state. There may be other treatment 
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dates where states required other e-tailers to collect sales tax for similar reasons, thus 
adding noise to my analyses and reducing the precision of my inferences. Second, I use 
aggregated state-level data, which coupled with a relatively few number of states (only 46 
states impose a general sales tax), creates extreme variability between state observations 
due to the variation in states’ economic sizes. 
 The implications from this study extend to state-policy makers wishing to impose 
sales tax nexus on e-tailing. My null result using click-through nexus suggests that states 
may need to find a way to compel e-tailers to cease abandonment of click-through nexus 
activities. However, my results that sales tax revenues increase within a year highlight a 
quick revenue turn around from a tax enforcement standpoint. Federal legislators may 
find these results useful as they debate legislation regarding online sales tax collections. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
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Variable Description
STC
Source: Census Bureau Quarterly State & Local Tax Revenues
RETAIL
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Economic Account
MANUFACTURE
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Economic Account
ESTAB
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
CITC
Source: Census Bureau Quarterly State & Local Tax Revenues
Variables of Interest
CLICK
(see endnote a)
Source: Baugh et al. (2016); Hand Collection.
Natural log of state GDP from the retail sector in the state. This
number is deannualized as follows: Q1 = (raw number / 4); Q2 =
 Q4 = (raw number / 4) - (Q1 + Q2 + Q3).
Natural log of state GDP from the manufacturing sector in the
This number is deannualized as follows:
Q1 = (raw number * 1/4);
Q2 = (raw number * 1/2) - Q1 ;
Q3 = (raw number * 3/4) - (Q1 + Q2);
Dependent Variables
Natural log of quarterly sales tax remittances to the state taxing
authority.
Q1 = (raw number * 1/4);
Q2 = (raw number * 1/2) - Q1 ;
Q3 = (raw number * 3/4) - (Q1 + Q2);
 Q4 = (raw number / 4) - (Q1 + Q2 + Q3).
Natural log of the number of NACIS subsector code 454 (mail-
order and electronic retail) establishments in the state.
of the period of change, zero otherwise.
Natural log of yearly corporate income tax remittances to the state
taxing authority.
Indicator equal to one for all quarters (years in CITC analyses) that
the state enforces click-through nexus on online retailers, inclusive
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Variable Description
LOOK
Source: Baugh et al. (2016); Hand Collection.
CLICKQ
LOOKQ
CLICKY
LOOKY
LOOKprior
LOOKnoprior
following initiation, and so forth.
Indicator equal to one for the specifc year since the state began
enforcing look-through nexus, where LOOKY1 is an indicator for
the year of initiation, LOOKY2 is an indicator for the year
following initiation, and so forth.
Subset of LOOK, where the indicator for look-through nexus is
one only if Amazon had a subsidiary with a physical presence in
the state prior to Amazon initiating sales tax collections, zero
otherwise.
Subset of LOOK, where the indicator for look-through nexus is
following initiation, and so forth.
Indicator equal to one for the specifc quarter since the state began
enforcing look-through nexus, where LOOKQ1 is an indicator for
the quarter of initiation, LOOKQ2 is an indicator for the quarter
following initiation, and so forth.
Indicator equal to one for the specifc year since the state began
Indicator equal to one for all quarters (years in CITC analyses) that
the state enforces look-though nexus on online retailers, inclusive
enforcing click-through nexus, where CLICKY1 is an indicator for
the year of initiation, CLICKY2 is an indicator for the year
of the period of change, zero otherwise. This indicator is proxied
enforcing click-through nexus, where CLICKQ1 is an indicator for
the quarter of initiation, CLICKQ2 is an indicator for the quarter
for by states that require Amazon to collect sales tax based on a
subsidiary's physical location in the state.
Indicator equal to one for the specifc quarter since the state began
one only if Amazon did not have a subsidiary with a physical
presence in the state prior to Amazon initiating sales tax collections
due to look-through nexus, zero otherwise.
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Variable Description
TAX control vector - Sales Tax
SRATE
Source: Tax Foundation; Hand Collection.
GROCERY
Source: Hand Collection.
AMNESTY_S
zero otherwise.
Source: Tax Foundation / Hand Collection.
SSUTA
Source: http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/
TAX control vector - Corporate Income Tax
CRATE
the year.
Source: Tax Foundation; Hand Collection.
BRACKET
during the year.
Source: Tax Foundation; Hand Collection.
SFACTOR
sales by more then 50%, zero otherwise.
Source: Hand Collection.
AMNESTY_C
of corporate income taxes, zero otherwise.
Source: Tax Foundation / Hand Collection.
Indicator equal to one if the state taxed groceries as of the
sales and use tax agreement during the quarter, zero otherwise.
beginning of the quarter, zero otherwise.
The highest marginal corporate income tax bracket in the state
Sales tax rate at the beginning of the quarter in the state.
point during the quarter for prior unremmitances of sales taxes,
Indicator equal to one if the state offered a sales tax amnesty at any
The highest marginal corporate income tax rate in the state during
Indicator equal to 1 if the state weights the apportionment factor on
Indicator equal to one if the state offerd a corporate income
tax amnesty at any point during the quarter for prior unremittances
Indicator equal to one if the state is a member of the streamlined
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Variable Description
ECONOMY control vector
WAGES
employment.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
PERC_RET
UNEMPLOY
Source: Census Bureau.
 websites.
CITC analyses).
in CITC analyses). This number excludes earnings from self-
State GDP from the retail sector as a percentage of total state GDP.
The average unemployment rate from the prior quarter (year in
for referring customers to the e-tailer's website via weblinks on the third-party affiliates'
(b) Look-through nexus refers to states that disregard the corporate structure of e-tailers
and impose sales tax nexus on e-tailers if the e-tailer has a physical subsidiary (e.g.
 distribution center; warehouse; research and development center) located in the state.
(a) Click-through nexus refers to state legislation that establishes sales tax nexus for
e-tailers if the e-tailer pays commissions to third-party affiliates that reside in the state
The natural log of employment wages from the prior quarter (year
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State Date State
Prior 
Presence Date
New York 04/23/08 Texas x 07/01/12
Rhode Island 07/01/09 Pennsylvania x 09/02/12
North Carolina 08/07/09 California x 09/16/12
Connecticut 07/01/11 Arizona x 02/01/13
Arkansas 10/27/11 New Jersey 07/01/13
Pennsylvania 12/01/11 Virginia x 09/01/13
Georgia 07/18/12 West Virginia x 10/01/13
California 09/15/12 Connecticut 11/01/13
Kansas 07/01/13 Massachusetts x 11/01/13
Maine 07/01/13 Wisconsin 11/01/13
Minnesota 07/01/13
Missouri 08/18/13
Indiana 01/01/14
Nevada x 01/01/14
New Jersey 07/01/14 Tennessee x 01/01/14
Illinois 01/01/15 Florida 05/01/14
Ohio 07/01/15 Maryland 10/01/14
Tennessee 07/01/15 Minnesota 10/01/14
Washington 09/01/15 Illinois 02/01/15
Michigan 10/01/15 Ohio 06/01/15
Nevada 10/01/15 Michigan x 10/01/15
Vermont 12/01/15
Column 1 lists states that enacted click-through nexus legislation or clarified existing
After 2013
After 2013
Table 1
Change in Enforcement Dates
Click-through Nexus
(1) (2)
Look-through Nexus
statutes to include click-through nexus, along with dates of enactment or clarifications.
State and date information is obtained from Baugh, Ben-David, and Park (2016) and
Internet search of all 50 states for the respective enforcement proxies.
Column 2 lists states that initiated enforcement of look-through nexus, proxied for by
states that required Amazon to initiate sales tax collections due to a physical location
(e.g. distribution center; warehouse; research & development center) in the state, along
with dates enforcement initiated. Prior Presence indicates states in which Amazon had
already established a physical presence before states required Amazon to initiate sales
tax collections.
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State Property General Excises Licenses Personal Corporat Other
AL 3.2% 26.3% 24.7% 6.0% 32.9% 4.7% 2.2%
AK 2.9% 0.0% 6.6% 3.9% 0.0% 18.0% 68.5%
AZ 5.2% 45.2% 14.2% 3.7% 25.1% 6.0% 0.6%
AR 8.8% 36.6% 13.8% 4.3% 30.2% 4.7% 1.5%
CA 2.6% 29.3% 8.3% 6.4% 44.6% 8.2% 0.4%
CO 0.0% 24.7% 14.2% 4.9% 49.7% 4.6% 1.8%
CT 0.0% 28.1% 16.7% 3.1% 44.4% 4.7% 3.0%
DE 0.0% 0.0% 14.7% 37.4% 35.2% 8.9% 3.9%
DC 28.8% 19.0% 8.5% 2.4% 27.0% 6.4% 8.0%
FL 1.2% 56.7% 22.6% 5.9% 0.0% 5.6% 8.0%
GA 1.0% 32.7% 9.7% 3.4% 47.5% 5.0% 0.5%
HI 0.0% 48.3% 15.1% 3.3% 30.4% 1.9% 1.0%
ID 0.0% 35.0% 12.8% 8.2% 38.1% 5.2% 0.7%
IL 0.4% 26.0% 19.5% 7.6% 35.8% 9.5% 1.2%
IN 0.0% 39.7% 16.2% 3.7% 32.8% 6.5% 1.1%
IA 0.0% 31.2% 14.8% 10.1% 38.4% 4.1% 1.5%
KS 1.5% 36.1% 12.5% 4.8% 37.2% 5.4% 2.6%
KY 5.4% 29.9% 16.4% 5.0% 34.2% 5.5% 3.5%
LA 0.4% 32.6% 22.2% 4.5% 27.4% 4.6% 8.3%
ME 1.3% 30.8% 16.2% 6.2% 39.1% 4.6% 1.9%
MD 3.7% 23.4% 18.1% 4.3% 42.8% 4.8% 2.9%
MA 0.0% 21.7% 9.4% 3.7% 54.1% 8.6% 2.5%
MI 8.3% 35.2% 12.8% 5.6% 29.5% 7.3% 1.2%
MN 2.9% 25.7% 17.0% 6.1% 40.7% 5.6% 2.0%
MS 0.5% 45.6% 18.5% 6.8% 21.4% 5.8% 1.4%
MO 0.2% 30.9% 14.9% 6.2% 43.8% 3.4% 0.6%
MT 11.8% 0.0% 22.6% 12.4% 36.3% 5.9% 10.9%
NE 0.0% 36.2% 13.1% 4.8% 39.9% 5.2% 0.7%
NV 3.3% 50.7% 29.3% 12.6% 0.0% 0.0% 4.2%
NH 15.9% 0.0% 37.7% 12.3% 4.3% 23.2% 6.5%
NJ 0.0% 29.5% 14.5% 5.1% 38.8% 8.5% 3.6%
NM 1.1% 38.1% 13.4% 5.2% 22.4% 4.8% 15.0%
NY 0.0% 18.9% 12.0% 2.4% 56.0% 6.8% 3.8%
NC 0.1% 24.8% 16.9% 6.2% 45.2% 5.9% 0.9%
ND 0.1% 25.8% 14.0% 5.6% 12.7% 4.9% 36.9%
OH 0.1% 32.7% 16.8% 9.8% 36.9% 3.2% 0.4%
Table 2
2005 to 2015 Average State Revenue Sources - Percent of Total Taxes
Sales Income
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STATE Property General Excises Licenses Personal Corporat Other
OK 0.0% 26.5% 13.9% 10.0% 34.6% 4.1% 10.8%
OR 0.2% 0.0% 12.5% 10.4% 69.8% 5.5% 1.6%
PA 0.3% 29.3% 19.9% 8.8% 30.7% 6.7% 4.3%
RI 0.1% 31.1% 20.5% 4.1% 38.1% 4.5% 1.6%
SC 0.2% 38.2% 14.7% 6.0% 36.3% 3.7% 0.9%
SD 0.0% 55.4% 24.6% 14.5% 0.0% 3.9% 1.6%
TN 0.0% 58.8% 17.3% 10.5% 1.9% 8.7% 2.8%
TX 0.0% 51.8% 28.2% 12.9% 0.0% 0.0% 7.2%
UT 0.0% 34.5% 12.7% 4.4% 41.9% 5.0% 1.7%
VT 29.1% 14.3% 20.7% 4.4% 25.5% 3.7% 2.2%
VA 0.2% 20.1% 14.3% 4.1% 54.1% 4.1% 3.1%
WA 11.9% 60.8% 17.2% 5.5% 0.0% 0.0% 4.6%
WV 0.1% 25.2% 24.7% 4.0% 30.5% 7.1% 8.3%
WI 0.8% 28.5% 15.3% 6.5% 42.2% 5.7% 1.0%
WY 12.8% 34.5% 6.9% 7.0% 0.0% 0.0% 38.8%
US Ave 2.0% 32.0% 15.5% 6.4% 34.8% 5.9% 3.4%
Sales Income
Table 2, continued
2005 to 2015 Average State Revenue Sources - Percent of Total Taxes
Data compiled from the U.S. Census Bureau's Quarterly Summary of State and Local
Tax Revenue (http://www.census.gov/govs/qtax/historical_data.html).
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Panel A: Click-through Nexus Sample
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev
STC 20.599 20.545 0.741 20.590 20.443 0.883
SRATE 0.054 0.060 0.011 0.052 0.051 0.012
GROCERY 0.280 0.000 0.449 0.283 0.000 0.451
AMNESTY_S 0.021 0.000 0.144 0.025 0.000 0.156
SSUTA 0.421 0.000 0.494 0.415 0.000 0.493
WAGES 23.910 23.992 0.856 23.873 23.881 1.059
UNEMPLOY 0.070 0.071 0.022 0.072 0.072 0.021
RETAIL 21.995 22.089 0.765 21.983 21.976 0.969
ESTAB 6.499 6.650 0.770 6.554 6.680 0.915
CITC 20.169 20.030 0.892 20.277 19.890 1.201
SFACTOR 0.407 0.000 0.493 0.459 0.000 0.502
CRATE 0.076 0.069 0.036 0.072 0.071 0.018
BRACKET 4.008 0.000 5.501 3.615 0.000 5.593
AMNESTY_C 0.103 0.000 0.306 0.131 0.000 0.340
Panel B: Look-through Nexus Sample
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev
STC 20.583 20.516 0.932 20.655 20.587 1.117
SRATE 0.054 0.055 0.008 0.056 0.060 0.011
GROCERY 0.242 0.000 0.429 0.200 0.000 0.400
AMNESTY_S 0.040 0.000 0.197 0.034 0.000 0.182
SSUTA 0.386 0.000 0.487 0.472 0.000 0.500
WAGES 23.736 23.721 1.050 23.903 24.065 1.109
UNEMPLOY 0.068 0.068 0.016 0.069 0.068 0.018
RETAIL 21.912 22.026 1.004 21.923 22.146 1.151
ESTAB 6.361 6.556 0.963 6.334 6.694 1.100
CITC 20.212 20.244 0.982 20.300 20.320 1.131
SFACTOR 0.368 0.000 0.484 0.380 0.000 0.488
CRATE 0.082 0.076 0.043 0.070 0.063 0.029
BRACKET 3.878 0.000 5.768 3.263 0.000 5.159
AMNESTY_C 0.120 0.000 0.326 0.110 0.000 0.314
(N = 114) (N = 90)
Table 3
Univariate Statistics
Border Assigned Random Assigned
(N = 522)
Border Assigned Random Assigned
(N = 398)
(N = 374)
(N = 145) (N = 117)
(N = 320)
 58 
  
 
 
 
  
Table 3, continued
Univariate Statistics
Univariate statistic analyses. Variables are defined in Appendix A.
Panel A includes the statistics for the samples used in click-through nexus analyses.
Panel B includes the statistics for the samples used in look-though nexus analyses.
Across both panels, the first set of statistics include the sample of states that changed the
respective sales tax nexus and all bordering "control" states (Border Assigned), while
second set of statistics include the sample of states that changed the respective sales tax
nexus and a randomly assigned "control" state (Random Assigned).
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Panel A: TREATEDQ = CLICK
Intercept 9.708 (12.063) 27.340 (17.608)
CLICK -0.015   (0.011) 0.011   (0.219)
SRATE 13.885   (1.888)*** 9.391   (5.150)*
GROCERY -0.120   (0.025)*** 0.096   (0.092)
AMNESTY_S 0.038   (0.028) 0.028   (0.042)
SSUTA -0.074   (0.074)*** -0.069   (0.027)**
WAGES 0.429   (0.429) -0.187   (0.668)
UNEMPLOY -0.041   (0.692) -2.134   (0.947)**
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
Panel B: TREATEDQ = LOOK
Intercept -4.530 (8.538) -25.907 (9.470)**
LOOK 0.020 (0.014)* 0.038 (0.029)*
SRATE -3.858 (4.214) -0.351 (3.373)
GROCERY -0.736 (0.136)*** 4.157 (1.295)***
AMNESTY_S -0.017 (0.017) -0.036 (0.053)
SSUTA -0.027 (0.066) -0.140 (0.040)***
WAGES 1.065 (0.343)*** 1.913 (0.361)***
UNEMPLOY 0.115 (1.682) 0.568 (1.862)
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
Yes Yes
374522
398 320
98.02%
98.36%97.57%
(1) (2)
Border Assigned Random Assigned
98.36%
Border Assigned Random Assigned
Yes Yes
Table 5
Sales Tax Nexus Impact on Sales Tax Collections - Levels
STCs,q = α + βTREATEDQs,q + γTAXs,q + δECONOMYs,q-1 + FEstate + FEquarter + εs,q
(1) (2)
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Panel C: TREATEDQ = LOOK; Bifurcated (LOOKprior & LOOKnoprior)
Intercept -4.260 (8.816) -27.051 (9.473)***
LOOKprior 0.022 (0.013)** 0.029 (0.017)**
LOOKnoprior 0.013 (0.071) 0.044 (0.028)
SRATE 3.686 (4.159) -0.472 (4.891)
GROCERY 0.083 (1.018) 4.174 (2.299)**
AMNESTY_S -0.176 (0.041) -0.036 (0.214)
SSUTA -0.028 (0.066) -0.140 (0.032)***
WAGES 1.062 (0.034)*** 1.918 (0.643)***
UNEMPLOY 0.049 (1.672) 0.636 (1.394)
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
column 2 across all panels includes states that changed the respective sales tax nexus
presence prior to enforcement (noprior).
Appendix A.
The dependent variable across all panels is the natural log of sales tax collections (STC).
The sample in column 1 across all panels includes states that changed the respective
sales tax nexus and all bordering "control" states (Border Assigned). The sample in
The variable of interest in Panel A is the indicator for quarters where the state enforces
click-through nexus (CLICK). The variable of interest in Panel B is the indicator for
quarters where the state enforces look-through nexus (LOOK). The variable of interest
Panel C is LOOK, bifurcated into proxy indicators where Amazon had a physical
presence prior to enforcement of look-through nexus (prior) and did not have a physical
Yes Yes
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% for hypothesized (non-hypothesized) results
are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2)
Border Assigned Random Assigned
398 320
98.01% 97.73%
Table 5, continued
Sales Tax Nexus Impact on Sales Tax Collections - Levels
and a randomly assigned "control" state (Random Assigned).
Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses. One-tailed (two-tailed)
Presentation of Model 1A results for test of Hypothesis 1. Variables are defined in
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Panel A: TREATEDQ = CLICK
Intercept 0.117 (0.078) -0.044 (0.077)
CLICKQ1 0.004 (0.013) 0.006 (0.016)
CLICKQ2 0.009 (0.022) 0.007 (0.019)
CLICKQ3 0.023 (0.016)* 0.010 (0.016)
CLICKQ4 0.032 (0.032) 0.035 (0.021)*
CLICKQ5 -0.004 (0.028) -0.011 (0.031)
CLICKQ6 0.050 (0.038) 0.037 (0.032)
CLICKQ7 -0.070 (0.058) -0.053 (0.048)
CLICKQ8 -0.004 (0.032) -0.001 (0.022)
SRATE 14.705 (3.103)*** 14.042 (3.511)***
GROCERY -0.118 (0.037)*** 0.176 (0.066)**
AMNESTY_S 0.043 (0.038) 0.049 (0.056)
SSUTA -0.024 (0.038) -0.045 (0.024)*
WAGES 0.962 (0.639) 0.454 (0.185)**
UNEMPLOY -0.005 (0.659) -1.583 (1.096)
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
Yes Yes
522 374
55.14% 42.41%
Table 6
Sales Tax Nexus Impact on Sales Tax Collections - Changes
(1) (2)
Border Assigned Random Assigned
                       + δ(ΔECONOMYs,q-1 to q-9) + FEstate + FEquarter + εs,q
ΔSTCs,q to q-8 = α + β(TREATEDQ1s,q ... TREATEDQ8s,q) + γ(ΔTAXs,q to q-8) 
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Panel B: TREATEDQ = LOOK
Intercept 0.005 (0.077) -0.058 (0.064)
LOOKQ1 0.068 (0.019)*** 0.036 (0.026)*
LOOKQ2 0.040 (0.020)** 0.009 (0.027)
LOOKQ3 0.028 (0.029) 0.007 (0.027)
LOOKQ4 0.087 (0.057)* 0.051 (0.035)*
LOOKQ5 0.042 (0.039) 0.016 (0.007)**
LOOKQ6 0.057 (0.030)** 0.054 (0.032)**
LOOKQ7 0.014 (0.038) 0.031 (0.032)
LOOKQ8 0.077 (0.058)* 0.079 (0.045)**
SRATE -1.017 (3.239) -0.051 (3.010)
GROCERY -0.043 (0.080) 0.024 (0.044)
AMNESTY_S 0.007 (0.016) 0.001 (0.018)
SSUTA -0.020 (0.076) -0.175 (0.035)***
WAGES 0.582 (0.297)* 1.084 (0.895)
UNEMPLOY -1.773 (1.100)* -0.633 (1.372)
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
398 320
40.42% 25.96%
Table 6, continued
Sales Tax Nexus Impact on Sales Tax Collections - Changes
Yes Yes
Border Assigned Random Assigned
(1) (2)
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Panel C: TREATEDQ = LOOK; Bifurcated (LOOKprior & LOOKnoprior)
Intercept 0.040 (0.079) -0.053 (0.066)
LOOKQ1prior 0.064 (0.024)*** 0.053 (0.037)*
LOOKQ2prior 0.052 (0.023)** 0.021 (0.032)
LOOKQ3prior 0.027 (0.029) 0.022 (0.008)**
LOOKQ4prior 0.088 (0.089) 0.056 (0.030)**
LOOKQ5prior 0.038 (0.023)** 0.039 (0.039)
LOOKQ6prior 0.057 (0.040)* 0.065 (0.037)**
LOOKQ7prior 0.045 (0.021)** 0.061 (0.037)**
LOOKQ8prior 0.107 (0.072)* 0.055 (0.031)**
SRATE -0.487 (3.437) -0.140 (3.023)
GROCERY -0.084 (0.084) 0.027 (0.046)
AMNESTY_S 0.003 (0.018) -0.007 (0.020)
SSUTA -0.022 (0.077) -0.168 (0.036)***
WAGES 0.535 (0.298)* -0.959 (0.432)**
UNEMPLOY -2.680 (1.112)** -1.562 (1.269)
LOOKQ1…LOOKQ8noprior
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
Yes
398 320
39.75% 24.94%
Yes Yes
Table 6, continued
Sales Tax Nexus Impact on Sales Tax Collections - Changes
(1) (2)
Border Assigned Random Assigned
Yes
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Table 6, continued
Sales Tax Nexus Impact on Sales Tax Collections - Changes
Presentation of Model 1B results for test of Hypothesis 1. Variables are defined in
The variables of interest in Panel A are the eight quarterly indicators after the state
enforces click-through nexus (CLICKQ1 through CLICKQ8). The variables of interest
Appendix A.
in Panel B are the eight quarterly indicators after the state enforces look-through nexus
(LOOKQ1 through LOOKQ8). The variables of interest in Panel C are LOOKQ1
through LOOKQ8, bifurcated into proxy indicators where Amazon had a physical
presence prior to enforcement of look-through nexus (prior) and did not have a physical
presence prior to enforcement (noprior).
are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The sample in column 1 across all panels includes states that changed the respective
sales tax nexus and all bordering "control" states (Border Assigned). The sample in
column 2 across all panels includes states that changed the respective sales tax nexus
and a randomly assigned "control" state (Random Assigned).
Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses. One-tailed (two-tailed)
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% for hypothesized (non-hypothesized) results
The dependent variable across all panels is the natural log of sales tax collections (STC).
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Panel A: TREATEDQ = CLICK
Intercept -0.059 (0.017)*** -0.048 (0.030)
CLICKQ1 0.006 (0.010) 0.002 (0.011)
CLICKQ2 0.010 (0.012) -0.011 (0.023)
CLICKQ3 0.008 (0.011) 0.001 (0.011)
CLICKQ4 0.020 (0.010)* 0.018 (0.012)
CLICKQ5 0.020 (0.013) 0.005 (0.015)
CLICKQ6 -0.001 (0.012) 0.007 (0.014)
CLICKQ7 0.004 (0.009) -0.003 (0.009)
CLICKQ8 -0.006 (0.008) -0.004 (0.010)
WAGES 0.474 (0.190)** 0.585 (0.305)*
UNEMPLOY -1.030 (0.325)*** -0.825 (0.678)
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
Panel B: TREATEDQ = LOOK
Intercept -0.074 (0.039)* 0.014 (0.047)
LOOKQ1 0.012 (0.014) 0.013 (0.015)
LOOKQ2 0.012 (0.015) 0.005 (0.022)
LOOKQ3 0.004 (0.013) 0.008 (0.014)
LOOKQ4 -0.024 (0.043) -0.018 (0.047)
LOOKQ5 0.004 (0.019) 0.004 (0.002)*
LOOKQ6 0.007 (0.016) 0.019 (0.021)
LOOKQ7 0.002 (0.014) 0.003 (0.018)
LOOKQ8 0.004 (0.016) -0.007 (0.019)
WAGES 0.807 (0.288)*** 1.369 (0.410)***
UNEMPLOY -0.366 (0.585) 0.374 (0.783)
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
Border Assigned Random Assigned
(1) (2)
70.48% 48.70%
522 374
Table 8
Sales Tax Nexus Impact on Sales Tax Collections - Changes
ΔRETAILs,q to q-8 = α + β(TREATEDQ1s,q ... TREATEDQ8s,q)
                       + δ(ΔECONOMYs,q-1 to q-9) + FEstate + FEquarter + εs,q
Yes Yes
(1) (2)
Border Assigned Random Assigned
Yes Yes
398 320
24.57% 22.51%
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Panel C: TREATEDQ = LOOK; Bifurcated (LOOKprior & LOOKnoprior)
Intercept -0.059 (0.040) 0.006 (0.047)
LOOKQ1prior -0.007 (0.017) 0.008 (0.019)
LOOKQ2prior 0.038 (0.021)** 0.042 (0.019)**
LOOKQ3prior 0.032 (0.010)*** 0.037 (0.20)*
LOOKQ4prior 0.033 (0.016)** 0.034 (0.011)***
LOOKQ5prior 0.028 (0.028) 0.050 (0.019)***
LOOKQ6prior 0.034 (0.022)* 0.029 (0.036)
LOOKQ7prior 0.032 (0.018)** 0.033 (0.020)**
LOOKQ8prior 0.027 (0.016)** 0.034 (0.024)*
WAGES 0.801 (0.290)*** 1.343 (0.420)***
UNEMPLOY 0.030 (0.553) 0.689 (0.796)
LOOKQ1…LOOKQ8noprior
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
Table 8, continued
Sales Tax Nexus Impact on Sales Tax Collections - Changes
(1) (2)
Border Assigned Random Assigned
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
398 320
26.30% 22.47%
Presentation of Model 2B results for test of Hypothesis 2a. Variables are defined in
Appendix A.
The variables of interest in Panel A are the eight quarterly indicators after the state
enforces click-through nexus (CLICKQ1 through CLICKQ8). The variables of interest
in Panel B are the eight quarterly indicators after the state enforces look-through nexus
(LOOKQ1 through LOOKQ8). The variables of interest in Panel C are LOOKQ1
through LOOKQ8, bifurcated into proxy indicators where Amazon had a physical
presence prior to enforcement of look-through nexus (prior) and did not have a physical
presence prior to enforcement (noprior).
The dependent variable across all panels is the natural log of gross state product from
The sample in column 1 across all panels includes states that changed the respective
sales tax nexus and all bordering "control" states (Border Assigned). The sample in
column 2 across all panels includes states that changed the respective sales tax nexus
retail (RETAIL).
and a randomly assigned "control" state (Random Assigned).
Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses. One-tailed (two-tailed)
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% for hypothesized (non-hypothesized) results
are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Panel A: TREATEDQ = CLICK
Intercept 5.934 (1.723)*** 3.371 (2.020)
CLICK -0.003 (0.017) -0.030 (0.019)
PERC_RET -1.262 (1.545) 0.728 (1.385)
WAGES 0.013 (0.074) 0.180 (0078)**
UNEMPLOY -0.857 (0.612) -3.561 (0.935)***
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
Panel B: TREATEDQ = LOOK
Intercept 3.621 (2.374) 9.829 (2.340)***
LOOK -0.044 (0.021)** -0.051 (0.023)**
PERC_RET -0.414 (1.315) -1.416 (1.311)
WAGES 0.170 (0.092)* -0.053 (0.092)
UNEMPLOY -2.324 (1.218)* -3.688 (1.219)***
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
Panel C: TREATEDQ = LOOK; Bifurcated (LOOKprior & LOOKnoprior)
Intercept 3.972 (2.405) 10.510 (2.401)***
LOOKprior -0.067 (0.022)*** -0.073 (0.024)***
LOOKnoprior -0.032 (0.023) -0.042 (0.024)*
PERC_RET 0.166 (1.322) -0.981 (1.406)
WAGES 0.155 (0.094) -0.079 (0.094)
UNEMPLOY -2.588 (1.266)* -3.937 (1.277)***
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
522
99.69%
374
99.70%
(1) (2)
99.81% 99.86%
398
99.82%
320
99.81%
Border Assigned Random Assigned
Yes Yes
398 320
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
(1) (2)
Border Assigned Random Assigned
Table 9
Sales Tax Nexus Impact on Retail Establishments - Levels
(1) (2)
ESTABs,q = α + βTREATEDQs,q + δECONOMYs,q-1 + FEstate + FEquarter + εs,q
Border Assigned Random Assigned
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Appendix A.
The variable of interest in Panel A is the indicator for quarters where the state enforces
subsector code 454 mail-order and e-tail establisthments (ESTAB).
click-through nexus (CLICK). The variable of interest in Panel B is the indicator for
quarters where the state enforces look-through nexus (LOOK). The variable of interest
Panel C is LOOK, bifurcated into proxy indicators where Amazon had a physical
presence prior to enforcement of look-through nexus (prior) and did not have a physical
Table 9, continued
Sales Tax Nexus Impact on Retail Establishments - Levels
Presentation of Model 3A results for test of Hypothesis 2b. Variables are defined in
are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
and a randomly assigned "control" state (Random Assigned).
Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses. One-tailed (two-tailed)
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% for hypothesized (non-hypothesized) results
presence prior to enforcement (noprior).
The dependent variable across all panels is the natural log of the number of NAICS
The sample in column 1 across all panels includes states that changed the respective
sales tax nexus and all bordering "control" states (Border Assigned). The sample in
column 2 across all panels includes states that changed the respective sales tax nexus
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Panel A: TREATEDQ = CLICK
Intercept 0.015 (0.129) -0.433 (0.189)**
CLICKQ1 -0.022 (0.013)* -0.019 (0.017)
CLICKQ2 -0.022 (0.017) -0.017 (0.021)
CLICKQ3 -0.002 (0.013) 0.003 (0.019)
CLICKQ4 -0.004 (0.017) 0.013 (0.016)
CLICKQ5 0.009 (0.016) 0.021 (0.020)
CLICKQ6 0.004 (0.016) 0.018 (0.021)
CLICKQ7 0.015 (0.025) 0.042 (0.025)*
CLICKQ8 0.016 (0.027) 0.041 (0.028)*
%RET -0.468 (1.671) 5.008 (2.451)*
WAGES -0.429 (0.296) -0.013 (0.184)
UNEMPLOY -1.252 (0.677)* -0.536 (0.894)
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
Border Assigned Random Assigned
Yes Yes
522 374
25.00% 57.35%
Table 10
Sales Tax Nexus Impact on Retail Establishments - Changes
(1) (2)
ΔESTABs,q to q-8 = α + β(TREATEDQ1s,q … β8TREATEDQ2s,q)
                           + δ(ΔECONOMYs,q-1 to q-8) + FEstate + FEquarter + εs,q
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Panel B: TREATEDQ = LOOK
Intercept 0.137 (0.134) 0.036 (0.226)
LOOKQ1 -0.028 (0.013)** -0.034 (0.017)**
LOOKQ2 -0.045 (0.021)** -0.049 (0.022)**
LOOKQ3 -0.048 (0.025)** -0.045 (0.025)**
LOOKQ4 -0.056 (0.027)** -0.047 (0.029)*
LOOKQ5 -0.054 (0.029)** -0.050 (0.031)*
LOOKQ6 -0.060 (0.031)** -0.054 (0.033)*
LOOKQ7 -0.045 (0.037) -0.045 (0.039)
LOOKQ8 -0.028 (0.037) -0.021 (0.038)
%RET 0.354 (1.700) 0.154 (2.654)
WAGES -0.096 (0.207) -0.396 (0.234)
UNEMPLOY 0.154 (1.236) -0.460 (1.232)
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
Table 10, continued
Sales Tax Nexus Impact on Retail Establishments - Changes
62.60% 61.77%
Yes Yes
398 320
(1) (2)
Border Assigned Random Assigned
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Panel C: TREATEDQ = LOOK; Bifurcated (LOOKprior & LOOKnoprior)
Intercept 0.098 (0.130) 0.020 (0.228)
LOOKQ1prior -0.024 (0.014)** -0.016 (0.023)
LOOKQ2prior -0.034 (0.017)** -0.050 (0.029)**
LOOKQ3prior -0.038 (0.040) -0.061 (0.030)**
LOOKQ4prior -0.042 (0.025)** -0.063 (0.046)*
LOOKQ5prior -0.054 (0.052) -0.073 (0.035)**
LOOKQ6prior -0.060 (0.026)** -0.082 (0.036)**
LOOKQ7prior -0.060 (0.036)** -0.085 (0.057)*
LOOKQ8prior -0.037 (0.049) -0.054 (0.041)
%RET 0.765 (1.668) 0.432 (2.663)
WAGES -0.097 (0.198) -0.418 (0.240)*
UNEMPLOY 0.109 (1.375) -0.730 (1.333)
LOOKQ1…LOOKQ8noprior
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
presence prior to enforcement of look-through nexus (prior) and did not have a physical
The dependent variable across all panels is the natural log of gross state product from
retail (RETAIL).
The sample in column 1 across all panels includes states that changed the respective
sales tax nexus and all bordering "control" states (Border Assigned). The sample in
presence prior to enforcement (noprior).
column 2 across all panels includes states that changed the respective sales tax nexus
and a randomly assigned "control" state (Random Assigned).
Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses. One-tailed (two-tailed)
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% for hypothesized (non-hypothesized) results
The variables of interest in Panel A are the eight quarterly indicators after the state
enforces click-through nexus (CLICKQ1 through CLICKQ8). The variables of interest
in Panel B are the eight quarterly indicators after the state enforces look-through nexus
(LOOKQ1 through LOOKQ8). The variables of interest in Panel C are LOOKQ1
through LOOKQ8, bifurcated into proxy indicators where Amazon had a physical
60.20% 61.26%
Table 10, continued
Sales Tax Nexus Impact on Retail Establishments - Changes
Presentation of Model 3B results for test of Hypothesis 2b. Variables are defined in
YesYes
Yes
(1) (2)
Border Assigned Random Assigned
398 320
Appendix A.
Yes
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Panel A: TREATEDY = CLICK
Intercept -0.464 (0.079)*** -0.624 (1.017)
CLICKY1 0.056 (0.123) -0.004 (0.138)
CLICKY2 0.072 (0.089) -0.017 (0.110)
CLICKY3 -0.069 (0.106) 0.126 (0.198)
SFACTOR -0.153 (0.283) -0.135 (0.240)
CRATE -3.254 (0.755)*** -18.299 (9.239)*
BRACKET 0.066 (0.051) 0.045 (0.067)
AMNESTY_C 0.165 (0.153) -0.048 (0.138)
WAGES 3.922 (1.014)*** 0.952 (7.835)
UNEMPLOY -0.671 (3.972) -1.252 (7.212)
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
Panel B: TREATEDY = LOOK
Intercept -0.971 (0.257)*** -0.143 (0.411)
LOOKY1 -0.092 (0.150) -0.183 (0.203)
LOOKY2 0.038 (0.168) -0.001 (0.163)
LOOKY3 0.039 (0.017)** 0.119 (0.075)*
SFACTOR 0.389 (0.251) 0.289 (0.272)
CRATE -1.566 (0.995) 0.071 (9.098)
BRACKET -0.001 (0.006) 0.012 (0.014)
AMNESTY_C 0.204 (0.227) -0.004 (0.083)
WAGES -0.562 (3.599) -0.153 (4.217)
UNEMPLOY -5.741 (5.770) 2.462 (5.340)
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
114
32.49%
90
6.93%
Yes Yes
145
41.58%
(1) (2)
Border Assigned Random Assigned
Table 12
Sales Tax Nexus Impact on Corporate Income Tax Collections - Changes
117
5.98%
ΔCITCs,y to y-2 = α + β(TREATEDY1s,y … +TREATEDY3s,y) + γ(ΔTAXs,y to y-2)
                        + δ(ΔECONOMYs,y-1 to y-3) + FEstate + FEyear + εs,y
(1) (2)
Border Assigned Random Assigned
Yes Yes
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Panel C: TREATEDY = LOOK; Bifurcated (LOOKprior & LOOKnoprior)
Intercept -0.967 (0.297)*** 0.036 (0.491)
LOOKY1prior -0.111 (0.118) -0.135 (0.124)
LOOKY2prior 0.040 (0.229) -0.056 (0.189)
LOOKY3prior 0.031 (0.021)* 0.125 (0.056)**
SFACTOR 0.379 (0.279) 0.258 (0.285)
CRATE -1.447 (1.078) -1.756 (9.249)
BRACKET -0.003 (0.007) -0.007 (0.013)
AMNESTY_C 0.220 (0.238) -0.001 (0.076)
WAGES -0.690 (3.682) -0.285 (4.135)
UNEMPLOY -6.615 (5.458) 2.132 (5.170)
LOOKY1…LOOKY3noprior
State & Quarter Fixed Effects
N
Adj R2
are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
through LOOKY3, bifurcated into proxy indicators where Amazon had a physical
presence prior to enforcement of look-through nexus (prior) and did not have a physical
presence prior to enforcement (noprior).
The dependent variable across all panels is the natural log of corporate income tax
collections (CITC).
The sample in column 1 across all panels includes states that changed the respective
sales tax nexus and all bordering "control" states (Border Assigned). The sample in
column 2 across all panels includes states that changed the respective sales tax nexus
and a randomly assigned "control" state (Random Assigned).
Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses. One-tailed (two-tailed)
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% for hypothesized (non-hypothesized) results
(LOOKY1 through LOOKY3). The variables of interest in Panel C are LOOKY1
114
31.34%
90
5.27%
Presentation of Model 4B results for test of Hypothesis 2. Variables are defined in
Appendix A.
The variables of interest in Panel A are the three yearly indicators after the state enforces
enforces click-through nexus (CLICKY1 through CLICKY8). The variables of interest
in Panel B are the three yearly indicators after the state enforces look-through nexus
Yes
Yes Yes
Yes
Border Assigned Random Assigned
(1) (2)
Table 12, continued
Sales Tax Nexus Impact on Corporate Income Tax Collections - Changes
